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  Andreas Marchetti 
Introduction 
In November 2005, the European Union and its Mediterranean partners 
celebrate the tenth anniversary of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership 
(EMP) that was initiated in Barcelona in 1995. Whereas in the beginning, 
the so-called Barcelona-Process responded mainly to concerns articulated 
by Southern EU-members, the necessity of a structured framework for the 
EU’s relations with Mediterranean countries is nowadays widely recog-
nised among all members of the Union. This is the result of general devel-
opments in international relations but also of the establishment of a 
functioning multilateral framework for structured dialogue and co-
operation with Mediterranean partners on behalf of the EU. 
However, whether after the first ten years of existence the Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership can be considered a success depends largely on 
the initial expectations attributed to the project. Surely, many shortcomings 
can be identified, especially if it comes to the concrete implementation of 
policies within the EMP-framework, but the process has also shown unique 
strengths on which the EU’s future policy can be built on. First of all, it has 
to be borne in mind that the “invention” of the EMP-format in 1995 estab-
lished a totally new policy design for the EU’s Mediterranean policy that 
had not been tested before. Besides, via the EMP a more or less consistent 
framework for enhancing relations multilaterally as well as bilaterally 
could be created. Another non-negligible feature is that the EMP managed 
to bring together very different partners and to maintain a frequent dialogue 
even in cases of rising tensions between them. By doing so, the EMP was 
successful in creating a better climate for the further development of Euro-
Mediterranean relations and of Mediterranean-Mediterranean relations as 
well. Andreas Marchetti 
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Nonetheless, the process has been far from perfect. After ten years of EMP 
it is therefore time to evaluate the process but also – and much more so – to 
look ahead and try to formulate the agenda for the coming years. The iden-
tification of future policy areas and the definition of European interests was 
at the core of this year’s “Mediterranean Forum”. The contributions outline 
concrete policy needs and attempt to formulate European interests in the 
respective areas. 
The contributions to the “Sixth Mediterranean Forum” have been compiled 
in the present Discussion Paper. The authors intend to participate in a de-
bate that is crucial for the EU’s future policy towards its Southern 
neighbours. Not only because of geographic proximity this eventually is 
also a debate on Europe itself and its future international role. 
As in previous years, the “Mediterranean Forum” is part of a larger project 
of co-operation between ZEI and the Konrad Adenauer Foundation on 
Euro-Mediterranean issues. It takes place in the framework of Euro-
Mediterranean Study Commission (EuroMeSCo) activities. ZEI graciously 
recognizes financial support of the Fritz Thyssen Foundation. 
 
 
 Stephen Calleya 
The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership 
and the Concept of the                  
Greater Middle East 
Given the direct bearing the Middle East peace process is already having 
on the evolution of the Euro-Mediterranean process, it certainly seems 
logical for the Europeans to dedicate more attention to Middle East affairs. 
The complementary nature of the Middle East Peace Process (MEPP) and 
the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) is clear, but the EMP’s poten-
tial to make a positive contribution to the stabilisation of the Middle East 
has yet to be fully realised. This is an area where the EMP political and se-
curity partnership needs to focus more of its strategic thinking in the years 
ahead. 
A major difference between Cold War Europe and the post-Cold War 
Mediterranean is that Mediterranean security issues continue to lack the 
international political support that multilateral initiatives such as the CSCE 
had on its side. The Mediterranean area in general, and the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict in particular, have not been highlighted regularly 
enough by such leading powers as the United States, Britain, France, Rus-
sia, Germany, the EU, NATO, or the UN to attract the necessary resources 
to start bridging the differences that exist between enemies across the 
southern shores of the basin. 
The EU on its own lacks the political and economic means to correct the 
socio-economic and political disparities in the Mediterranean. This is even 
more the case now that the EU is digesting its largest enlargement of ten 
new members and is seeking to play a more active international role 
through its neighbourhood policy. Even more disturbing is the fact that in-Stephen Calleya 
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dividual EU member states such as Spain and Italy that have the potential 
to play a more influential role in the Mediterranean, have so far shown little 
interest in launching a comprehensive Mediterranean security policy. 
In the emerging security landscape of the post-Cold War era, the United 
States can certainly help make up for some of Europe’s shortcomings along 
its southern periphery. Co-operating in the Mediterranean could be a policy 
that assists in strengthening the transatlantic partnership at a stage in his-
tory when its entire raison d’etre is being questioned.  
The post-Cold War era has already witnessed an increase in both unilateral-
ist and multilateralist tendencies. The end of the Cold War has seen an in-
crease in the proliferation of international interventions that began during 
the first Bush administration with the invasion of Panama in 1989, the Per-
sian Gulf War in 1991, and the humanitarian intervention in Somalia in 
1992. This trend continued during the Clinton years with interventions in 
Haiti, Bosnia and Kosovo and again in the George W. Bush administration 
in the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.
1 
One could also think that after the terror attacks of September 11
th 2001 
Washington would be more interested in helping to avoid the emergence of 
new fault-lines such as those that threaten neighbouring countries in the 
Mediterranean. America has however opted to focus its superpower atten-
tion on the eastern sector of the Mediterranean basin and beyond in central 
Asia. Improving the livelihood of the millions of people along the southern 
shores of the Mediterranean has not emerged as a foreign policy goal, a 
strategic error that could come back to haunt the superpower in the decade 
ahead. 
If the clash of civilisations scenario is not to attract tens of thousands of 
recruits in the years ahead the West must find ways of opening further 
channels of communication with all governments in the Mediterranean, in-
cluding possible Islamic regimes. Otherwise the slow process of democ-
raticisation in the Maghreb and the Mashreq will come to a halt and the 
wave of anti-Western radicalisation may increase.  
 
1  Kagan, Robert, Of Paradise and Power, America and Europe in the New World Or-
der, New York: Alfred A. Knopf Publishers, 2003, p. 27. The EMP and the Concept of the Greater Middle East 
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Some estimates envisage as many as twenty million people in North Africa 
opting for emigration into Europe in the coming few years, where salaries 
are anything between eight to ten times higher than in the South.
2 The 
emergence of a “Fortress like Europe” where borders are sealed in an effort 
to discourage possible migrants would only exacerbate this problem fur-
ther. European policy-makers should recall that large communities of 
workers originating in sub region of the Mediterranean such as the 
Maghreb, have already made a significant contribution to the success of 
European industry.
3  
The perception of racist and exclusionary migration policies towards their 
kin across the Mediterranean will only aggravate regional social insecurity 
and could be used as a mechanism to fuel the possibility of a “cold war” 
between Islam and the West. The proliferation of conventional weapons 
and weapons of mass destruction since the end of the Cold War increases 
the serious nature of such a development in contemporary international re-
lations. While there is no questioning the military superiority of the West 
over any of the countries in the Middle East region, there is no denying that 
a proliferation of weapons in such a volatile area as the Mediterranean 
could have serious consequences.   
More than a decade since the end of the Cold War there are clearer signs 
that the East-West divide of the past is being replaced by an international 
security system where North-South divisions are becoming the dominant 
feature. Unlike the European continent where the fall of the Berlin Wall 
ushered in a period of reconciliation, the Mediterranean remains a frontier 
area of divisions. European and Middle East international region disparities 
and conflict continue to be the hallmark of Mediterranean interchange.    
While the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership has sought to arrest the process 
of polarisation between the northern and southern shores of the Mediterra-
nean, the post-Cold War era has so far not seen a significant reversal of this 
 
2  Collinson, Sarah,  Shore to Shore, The Politics of Migration in Euro-Maghreb Rela-
tions, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1996. 
3  Joffe, George, ‘The European Union and the Maghreb’, in Gillespie, R., (ed.), Medi-
terranean Politics, London, Pinter Publishers, 1994, p. 163. Stephen Calleya 
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trend. This structural development is what is stifling the establishment of a 
co-operative Mediterranean region. 
It is however fundamentally clear that the EMP offers a unique opportunity 
to strengthen political, economic and cultural ties across the Euro-
Mediterranean area. But such progress will only be registered if all the 
EMP partner countries direct their actions at the causes rather than the 
symptoms of contemporary disparities and security risks. This is not to say 
that humanitarian and development assistance is not essential, but this 
should not become a substitute for efforts that are geared towards increas-
ing higher levels of co-operation between the countries of the Mediterra-
nean. 
Throughout its thirty years of direct engagement in the Mediterranean the 
European Union has failed to contain, let alone reverse, economic dispari-
ties between the northern and southern countries of the basin. It is also 
quite clear that little progress has been registered in removing the misper-
ceptions and prejudice that currently exist in the region or in promoting fur-
ther the principles of respect and understanding. A concerted effort in 
implementing specific goals in each of the three chapters of the Barcelona 
Declaration is certainly the most effective way to start tackling such prob-
lems. 
A decade since the launching of the EMP it is clear that the Barcelona 
Process is simply a vehicle that can assist those Mediterranean countries 
that are interested in modernising their societies, their political systems and 
their economies through the process of post-Cold War transition. But the 
EMP is only a potential vehicle of change - it is up to the Mediterranean 
countries themselves to take up the challenge.
4 
The time has therefore come for the EU to take seriously the concerted call 
coming from the South to move away from assistance to a true partnership. 
The EU Common Strategy on the Mediterranean adopted in June 2000 calls 
for a more interactive and dynamic relationship between the EU and the 
Mediterranean. It is a strategic perspective that the EU is now starting to 
 
4  Calleya, Stephen, Evaluating Euro-Mediterranean Relations, Routledge Publishing 
House, 2005, pp.1-9. The EMP and the Concept of the Greater Middle East 
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flesh out through its neighbourhood action plans with countries along the 
southern shores of the Mediterranean.
5  
The neighbourhood action plans will also introduce an element of flexibil-
ity when it comes to implementing reform programmes. Enhanced co-
operation will be possible by allowing those that are able and willing to 
move ahead to move faster. Countries that are not able or determined to 
push ahead a reform agenda would do well to abstain, at least temporarily. 
When reviewing admission of new members careful consideration should 
be given to their capacity and willingness to implement the Barcelona ac-
quis. Those that are not prepared to adopt such a programme should not be 
admitted as they will only constitute 'dead weight' for the more performing 
members of the club. 
At the same time, the EU should not be expected to deliver the impossible 
in the Mediterranean. An analysis of the ability of international organisa-
tions to influence regional relations reveals that while they are often capa-
ble of having an impact on the regional patterns of relations they are unable 
to alter the basic pattern of regional alignment and conflict within such in-
ternational regions. Contemporary EU involvement in the Mediterranean is 
a good example of an international organisation’s limited ability to influ-
ence regional dynamics. The first decade of the EU’s Mediterranean Part-
nership policy is best seen as a boundary management exercise, rather than 
a boundary transformation one.
6  
The EMP’s principal aim has so far been to safeguard the process of re-
gional integration in Europe from that of fragmentation that is active 
throughout the Middle East. More emphasis now needs to be dedicated to 
helping improve the outlook of Mediterranean citizens by transforming the 
area into a more stable and prosperous one.  
 
5  Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the Commission 
to the Council and the European Parliament, ‘Wider Europe – Neighbourhood: A 
Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours’, Com, 2003, 
104 final of 11.03.03. 
6  Calleya, Stephen, Navigating Regional Dynamics in the Post-Cold War World, Pat-
terns of Relations in the Mediterranean Area, Aldershot, Dartmouth, 1997, p. 186. Stephen Calleya 
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A conceptual re-think is thus necessary if the process of political, economic 
and cultural adaptation is to be a successful one. The process and progress 
need to be carefully monitored. The question of the social impact of the 
implementation of a free trade area is not a question of lessons and clichés, 
but of developing realistic policies to cope with the changes being intro-
duced.  
The decision to establish a free trade area is certain to have a social cost. 
Having decided to implement a free trade area the Barcelona Process calls 
for all of the Partner countries to co-operate at numerous levels in order to 
ensure a smooth transition that will include safeguarding the Rule of Law 
to ensure stability. 
A number of additional strategic questions need to be addressed if the chal-
lenge of superseding sources of instability in the Mediterranean is to be 
achieved in the years ahead. The time has come to re-visit the issue of es-
tablishing a more coherent and effective link between the Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership and two other leading actors in the region, 
namely the United States and NATO. The enormous task facing the EU in 
the Mediterranean and the comprehensive nature of the EMP makes it logi-
cal to identify measures where both the United States and NATO can play a 
more direct role in implementing the Barcelona Declaration agenda.
7  
There is no doubt that both America and NATO can share essential experi-
ence they have developed in the Euro-Mediterranean area when it comes to 
realising the goals set out in the political and security chapter of the Barce-
lona Process. While neither Washington nor the Atlantic Alliance should be 
allowed to dictate the EMP course of events, their involvement in contem-
porary Euro-Mediterranean relations is likely to give a kick-start to the 
stalemate that has captured the Euro-Mediterranean political and security 
dialogue. Closer co-operation between Brussels, Washington and the At-
lantic Alliance will also boost the chances of implementing the final status 
 
7  Rhein, Eberhard, and Cameron, Fraser, Promoting Political and Economic Reform in 
the Mediterranean and Middle East, European Policy Centre Issue Paper 33, 
18.05.05.  See also Calleya, Stephen, op.cit., 2005, pp.131-132. The EMP and the Concept of the Greater Middle East 
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objectives of the Middle East “Roadmap” once the Israelis and Palestinians 
are fully committed to such a course of action.  
Inviting representatives from the United States and NATO to EMP foreign 
ministerial meetings will also boost the credibility of such gatherings, just 
as inviting representatives from the Arab League and the Arab Maghreb 
Union is already achieving. American and NATO representatives can be 
invited in an observer’s capacity and allowed to interact with key policy 
makers seeking to improve Euro-Mediterranean relations.  
Another question that needs to be seriously addressed is the extent to which 
the EU truly speaks a common language when it comes to the Mediterra-
nean. It is not yet evident that all EU member states regard the Mediterra-
nean as a strategic concern. References to a common foreign and security 
policy sometimes ring hollow when it comes to support of the EMP. All 
European states should openly declare their commitment to the EMP on the 
occasion of its tenth anniversary. It will be interesting to observe whether 
the large increase of non-Mediterranean E U  m e m b e r  s t a t e s  r e s u l t s  i n  a  
diminution of support towards Mediterranean policies. EU member states 
from Northern and Eastern Europe would do well to remember that security 
in Europe is indivisible from security in the Mediterranean.  
In contrast, Southern EU member states continue to forward Mediterranean 
oriented policies, even though a consistent and coherent policy framework 
is quite often lacking. Better co-ordination between the Southern EU mem-
ber states in the first instance and eventually all EU member states when it 
comes to implementation of the EMP agenda is a prerequisite to realising 
the ambitious goals set out in the Barcelona Declaration. 
The horrific turn of events on September 11
th 2001 is evidence enough of 
what could happen if the disconnect between different cultures and civilisa-
tions is allowed to grow. With the benefit of hindsight, the Barcelona Dec-
laration of November 1995 identified several of the contemporary security 
challenges that need to be dealt with if the “clash of civilisations” thesis is 
not to become more of a possibility.
8 Terrorism and the proliferation of 
 
8  Huntington, Samuel, The Clash of Civilisations and the Remaking of World Order; 
New York, Simon and Schuster, 1996. Stephen Calleya 
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weapons of mass destruction have become household security concerns af-
ter the terror attacks of September 11
th 2001. The threats that advances in 
technology have brought are also more apparent as life in the digital age is 
already demonstrating.  
Without a common political, economic and cultural channel of communica-
tion misperceptions across the Mediterranean will result in a permanent 
divide between the prosperous northern shores of the basin and the impov-
erished southern shores of the Mediterranean Sea. The emergence of such a 
fault-line would have dire consequences for all peoples in the Mediterra-
nean area and beyond. 
Promoting Political and Economic Reform: What role 
for the EU? 
In 2005 a number of developments have given rise to speculation that de-
mocracy might be breaking out in the Arab world. The most important 
events include the peaceful presidential elections in Palestine and the spec-
tacle in January 2005 of some eight million Iraqis turning out to vote in the 
first free elections ever. Encouraged by such developments President 
George W. Bush publicly called for change even in Saudi Arabia and 
Egypt, two long-standing authoritarian allies of the US. This theme was 
echoed in a major policy speech delivered by American Secretary of State, 
Condoleeza Rice, at the American University in Cairo in June 2005.
9  
Shortly after the war against Iraq in 2003, the US launched its Greater 
Middle East Initiative with much fanfare, but with few resources and with 
no consultation with the EU or indeed the countries in the region. The 
initiative, now renamed the Broader Middle East Initiative (BMEI) is the 
flagship foreign policy of Bush’s second term and is a direct response to 
9/11 and the ‘war on terrorism’. The BMEI seeks to promote democractic 
reform across the Middle East region.   
 
9  Economist, ‘America and the Middle East – Does He Know Where it’s leading?”, 
30th July – 5th August 2005, pp. 24-26. The EMP and the Concept of the Greater Middle East 
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However, although there are some buds of a democratic spring, the 2005 
UN Arab Human Development Report paints a bleak picture of democ-
racy’s progress in the region. The report blames the “freedom deficit” for a 
wide range of ills, including lagging rates of growth, poor performance in 
science and innovation and widespread human-rights abuses. Oppression is 
bad for governments too, because it deprives them of legitimacy and pro-
vides outside powers with a pretext to intervene in Arab affairs.
10 
Indeed many Arab regimes practise what the report terms a “legitimacy of 
blackmail”, sustaining their power by posing as the only bulwark against 
chaos or a takeover by Islamist extremists. Another common feature is 
what the authors call the “black hole” state. Arab republics and monarchies 
alike grant their rulers such unchallengeable power as to “convert the sur-
rounding social environment into a setting in which nothing moves and 
from which nothing escapes.” The authors describe a life-long system that 
whittles away personal freedoms, beginning with patriarchalism and clan-
nishness in Arab family life, extending through school systems that favour 
the parroting of fixed ideas rather than open inquiry, and on through citi-
zenship restricted by arbitrary laws and limits to free expression. Out of 21 
Arab countries, 17 prohibit the publication of journals without hard-to-get 
licences, seven ban the formation of political parties altogether, and three 
(Egypt, Sudan and Syria) have declared permanent states of emergency that 
date back decades.  
The EU has not been totally serious about using conditionality to promote 
reform. There are clauses in the Association Agreements (Art. 2) that pro-
vide for its suspension in light of violations of human rights and democratic 
principles but they have never been invoked. 
To give it credit the Commission keeps on trying. It put forward a Commu-
nication of May 2003 arguing that political reform was the key to achieving 
sustainable security and stability. The more recent neighbourhood action 
plans contain a long chapter concerning democracy and the judicial and the 
EU has proposed a conference on human rights in 2006. Most important, 
 
10  Special thanks to Dr. Eberhard Rhein, Senior Analyst at the European Policy Centre 
in Brussels, for sharing his views on this issue. Stephen Calleya 
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the EU is now openly pledging to increase finance for partners with a clear 
commitment to political reforms. 
It is clear that the pace of political and economic reform cannot be imposed 
by external actors. Ukraine is a case in point. But who dares to envisage an 
“Orange Revolution” with the necessary follow-up – clean up of corrup-
tion, democratic decision-making and strict observance of the rule of law- 
in many Arab countries in any near future. Lebanon has come close to it, 
under special circumstances of political assassination and outside occupa-
tion. Of course, the EU should insist on free legislative elections in Leba-
non and let it be known that free elections will have a positive impact on 
future relations with the EU. 
Equally, the EU should assist the emerging opposition in Egypt preparing 
and freely campaigning in the presidential elections in the autumn of 2005. 
It should let it be known widely that it would consider their fairness as a 
test case for serious political reforms. Those who press for reforms in the 
South must have trust in the EU coming to help them in their struggle to 
promote democracy and human rights. In may be wise to concentrate on a 
few outstanding examples in the hope and expectation that freedom will 
have a knock-on effect.  
Extending the European Neighbourhood Policy to the South constitutes a 
step that goes beyond economic technicalities.  But it refrains from calling 
for dramatic changes in governance. Wisely, the 5-year Action Plans that 
the EU has signed in 2004 with Morocco, Tunisia, Jordan and Palestine are 
no more than a “check list” of some 100+ specific political, juridical and 
economic reform steps, among which partner countries are free to choose 
what suits them, what appears urgent and feasible to them.
11 
The EU has little control over the implementation of the action plans in the 
partner countries. It may offer technical assistance (e.g. for twinning de-
vices) or more financial support (e.g. for overdue educational reforms or 
population policies). But it does, and should not, sit in the driver` s seat. It 
 
11  Emerson, Michael, and Noutcheva, Gergana, From Barcelona Process to 
Neighbourhood Policy: Assessments and Open Issues, CEPS Working Document, 
No.220, March 2005. The EMP and the Concept of the Greater Middle East 
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should not try to impose itself. If a country does not want to push ahead 
with reforms it will have to bear the consequences. Nobody will bail it out.  
It should, however, be fully prepared to assist those countries that are truly 
willing to engage in reforms. It should focus its limited energy on these, it 
should even be ready to lend its support to reform agendas partner coun-
tries might propose. Sooner or later other countries will follow suit, when 
they realise the benefits of reforms in their neighbourhood.  
Nothing would be more inappropriate than excessive zeal. The EU 
neighbour countries in the South understand perfectly well the mechanisms 
and advantages of democracy, respect of human rights, the rule of law and 
a well-functioning judiciary. But, for various reasons, above all the self-
interest of those at the top, their governments fail to take the appropriate 
action. Their elites benefit too much from the status quo to ask for reforms 
that may leave them worse off. 
To transpose the Ukrainian precedent to the South, the EU should inter-
vene, at the most appropriate level and ideally jointly with other countries, 
e.g. the USA, in favour of the emerging opposition in Egypt so as to allow 
it to prepare and campaign, unhampered by any restrictions, in the forth-
coming presidential elections in the fall of 2005. It should propose interna-
tional election monitors to scrutinise the preparation and holding of these 
elections and let the Egyptian government know that it would consider their 
fairness as a test case for serious political reforms in the country. 
Publishing annual “reform progress reports” for the neighbourhood coun-
tries, as the EU has successfully done for the accession countries, will go 
into the same direction. It will disseminate information, fast, objective and 
comprehensive, about the reform process around the Mediterranean. 
Profound educational reforms should constitute the number one long-term 
priority in most of the neighbour countries. The EU intends to substantially 
step up it’s funding in this area and this is something that should be ap-
plauded. The EU Commission should, as a matter of urgency, build the 
necessary in-house expertise.  Raising educational standards is a precondi-
tion for higher living standards and a viable democracy! Of course, what-Stephen Calleya 
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ever educational reforms take place, these should respect the cultural and 
religious specificities of Arab countries.
12 
The other over-arching priority area should be the improving of the judici-
ary, with special emphasis on commercial courts. Its quality is lacking in 
practically all the neighbour countries. They all need better trained and 
well-paid judges, appointed for life, acting in full independence from any 
political influence. As long as international business does not have trust in 
the effectiveness and independence of the judiciary it will shun the coun-
tries around the Mediterranean. 
Europe’s role in the Promotion of the Quartet’s Road-
map 
A decade after the Oslo Peace accords ushered in a sense of euphoria in the 
Middle East, a new sense of hope emerged in the spring of 2003 with the 
long awaited publication of the “Roadmap” that is supposed to help Israel 
and the Palestinians return to the negotiating table after almost three years 
of bloodshed.13 
While publication of the peace plan was certainly a positive development, 
an assessment of the “Roadmap” clearly indicated that it appeared too am-
bitious when it came to keeping to suggested timeframes. The delay in pub-
lishing the “Roadmap” already resulted in the goals set for 2003 being 
behind schedule. May 2003 was supposed to see the ending of terror and 
violence in the region and the commencement of creating Palestinian insti-
tutions that will be the backbone of an eventual Palestinian state.  
Phase Two of the “Roadmap” between June 2003 and December 2003 was 
supposed to see efforts focused on creating an independent Palestinian state 
with provisional borders and attributes of sovereignty, based on a new con-
stitution. This phase will actually start when Palestinian elections have 
 
12  Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the Commission 
to the Council and the European Parliament, ‘Tenth Anniversary of the Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership: A Work Programme to Meet the Challenges of the Next 
Five Years’, April 2005. The EMP and the Concept of the Greater Middle East 
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been held and will seek to ensure ratification of a democratic Palestinian 
constitution. During this phase the sponsors of the “Roadmap”, the Quartet 
that consists of the United States, the European Union, the United Nations 
and Russia, are also scheduled to convene an international conference to 
address the issue of supporting Palestinian economic recovery and formally 
launching the process that will lead to the creation of a Palestinian state. At 
best, such an international effort may now take place in 2006 after district 
elections have taken place across the Palestinian territories.        
Phase Three of the “Roadmap” that was originally scheduled o take place 
in 2004 and 2005 is to consist of Israeli-Palestinian final status negotiations 
that are to iron out differences on all outstanding issues so that a permanent 
status agreement can be signed. This will be followed by a second interna-
tional conference to be convened to endorse the agreement reached on a 
provisional independent Palestinian state. The final agreement would also 
consist of a permanent settlement of all issues including those concerning 
borders, Jerusalem, refugees, and settlements. Support will also be forth-
coming to support progress towards a comprehensive Middle East settle-
ment between Israel and Lebanon and Syria.     
Despite the “Roadmap’s” best intentions, it is evident that this peace plan 
can only be implemented if the indigenous actors in this conflict are finally 
prepared to co-exist with one another. While Palestinian President Mah-
moud Abbas has consistently expressed that he is satisfied with the targets 
set out in the “Roadmap” document – it remains to be seen if he will be 
able to deliver the necessary reforms in the short timeframes indicated.  
The other main actor to watch in the months ahead is Israeli Prime Minister 
Ariel Sharon. His coalition government and the Likud Party itself are cer-
tain to put pressure on him to resist agreement on freezing and dismantling 
of the settlements. Sharon has already indicated that Israel will want to ne-
gotiate some parts of the “Roadmap” before moving to the final stages of 
implementation. This could result in a premature collapse of the entire ini-
tiative. 
 
13  Calleya, Stephen, op.cit., 2005, pp.43-45. Stephen Calleya 
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The performance based and goal driven “Roadmap” has been drawn and is 
to be executed under the auspices of the Quartet. Although the Quartet have 
pledged to meet regularly at senior levels to evaluate the parties’ perform-
ance on implementation of the plan it is clear that only a more direct moni-
toring and enforcement stance is likely to ensure target dates being 
respected. The Quartet would certainly boost their profile in the region by 
appointing high profile envoys to the Middle East to monitor implementa-
tion of the “Roadmap”. At very least the Quartet should agree to appoint 
one envoy to shuttle between the Israeli and Palestinian delegations and be 
on hand whenever thorny issues risk derailing the entire process.     
If the Quartet is to be a credible sponsor of this Middle East peace initiative 
they must also be seen to be singing from the same song sheet. Differences 
that surfaced at a transAtlantic level between Europe and the United States 
over the Iraq war in the first half of 2003 should be completely put aside if 
the Quartet is to have any influence on the course of Israeli-Palestinian re-
lations. A concerted campaign to end the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and 
establish a Palestinian state may actually facilitate the task of patching up 
differences between the great powers and simultaneously improve the per-
ception of the entire Quartet, especially the United States, in the Middle 
East. 
Timing is everything if the roadmap is to be successful. The different 
phases can only be implemented if the provisions outlined in the previous 
phase have been achieved. Of course even if the roadmap timeline slips 
somewhat, the goal of a permanent settlement is what ultimately matters. 
But a result driven initiative such as the “Roadmap” must be seen to be de-
livering the goods if the parties concerned are not to lose faith in this inter-
national peace plan. My mid 2005, too few results have been achieved to 
indicate that the “Roadmap” will be successfully implemented in the near 
future. 
After the Oslo experience both Israel and the Palestinians have an enhanced 
sense of realism. One hopes that the horrific experience of the alternative to 
peace will help both the Palestinians and the Israelis make the difficult The EMP and the Concept of the Greater Middle East 
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compromises necessary if a permanent settlement to the Middle East con-
flict is to be found. 
Stability in the Middle East is dependent upon resolution of the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict. The international community in general and the United 
States and Europe in particular, must dedicate the same effort and resolve 
that they did when dealing with Iraq towards resolving the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict. Only then will a significant step have been taken to-
wards transforming the Middle East region, a prerequisite to creating a 
more secure Mediterranean geopolitical area.    
Nevertheless, the European Union will have to advance carefully if it is not 
to upset the concept of “balancing” in relations between Mediterranean 
states and their external patrons. If the EU is perceived as attempting to 
dominate intra-Mediterranean patterns of interaction, non-EU Mediterra-
nean countries could retaliate by becoming less co-operative in their deal-
ings with specific EU member states that have substantial political and 
economic interests in the area.14 
The consequences of such a turn of events would be very high if such a 
trans-Mediterranean backlash were to include the key oil and gas produc-
ers. Perceptions of a more hegemonic EU could also fuel support for politi-
cal movements that advocate anti-Western policies across the Arab world, 
adding to insecurity across the Euro-Mediterranean region. The more hard-
line European and American security policies that have been introduced 
since the terror attacks of September 11th 2001 and the instantaneous cable 
television coverage across the Arab world through such outlets as the Al 
Jazeera television network have already helped to increase anti-Western 
sentiments across the southern shores of the Mediterranean, The mishan-
dling of Euro-Mediterranean political and security relations would only fur-
ther such resentment.  
The European Union must therefore seek to implement a Euro-
Mediterranean political and security policy that addresses the concerns of 
both EU and Mediterranean states. Such a policy should be formulated 
 
14  Ibid., pp.63-65. Stephen Calleya 
  22   
through an intense political dialogue between EU and Mediterranean coun-
tries and implemented in such a manner that everyone’s security rights are 
respected. 
The European Union must also formulate an external affairs strategy to-
wards the Middle East that does not appear to be duplicating Washington’s 
endeavours to broker a peace settlement in the region and advance reform 
through the Broader Middle East Initiative. Failure to adopt such a policy 
will only diminish already scarce transatlantic political and economic re-
sources. It could also lead to a situation where the European involvement in 
the Middle East is regarded more through a competitive lens than a com-
plementary one. 
The fluid nature of contemporary international relations in the Middle East 
certainly offers the European Union with an opportunity to upgrade its in-
fluence in this geo-strategically proximate region. One option that could 
assist the EU in becoming more effective in the region is to introduce a po-
litical mechanism that will allow it to adopt a more regular, rapid and flexi-
ble type of involvement in the Middle East.  
This could take the form of creating a specific ad hoc committee that would 
assist the EU’s special envoy to the Middle East. This committee would be 
mandated to constantly update the EU Commission and the Council of 
Ministers about regional patterns of relations and peace process develop-
ments. The introduction of such a committee would also facilitate commu-
nication flows between Europe and the Middle East protagonists, a 
confidence building measure in itself.  
If a Middle East peace breakthrough does not emerge in the near future as a 
result of the Road Map initiative the international community under the 
leadership of the United States should step back from the current stalemate 
and conduct a complete re-assessment of the Middle East situation. The 
European Union must also do more than simply accept its subordinate role 
in the region – it is a major economic player in the Middle East and should 
seek to play as important a political role.  
For some reason the EU has so far not sought the active role in the Mediter-
ranean area that one would expect from a regional power that is so geo-The EMP and the Concept of the Greater Middle East 
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graphically proximate to the Middle East. EU membership of Cyprus in 
2004 and potential EU membership negotiations with Turkey starting in 
2005 will bring the “Middle East backyard” even closer to the EU’s bor-
ders. Until it seeks to play an important political role in this geo-strategic 
theatre the EU’s aspiration of projecting a common foreign and security 
policy will largely remain a fallacy.  Martin Ortega 
The Euro-Mediterranean Dialogue and 
the EU’s Common Security and Defence 
Policy 
Excluding or Reinforcing? 
The tenth anniversary of the Barcelona process constitutes an excellent op-
portunity to reinforce the Euro-Mediterranean dialogue on security and de-
fence issues. However, some political obstacles, including a tense situation 
in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, affect negatively such a prospect. In 
Europe, the constitutional impasse created after the French and Dutch ref-
erendums equally casts some doubts on the ability of the EU member states 
to proceeding with ambitious foreign policy projects. This is not to say that 
the Barcelona process is at risk, but the psychological impetus needed to 
deepen the Euro-Mediterranean dialogue might be lacking. In these cir-
cumstances, the reinforcement of the Euro-Mediterranean dialogue in secu-
rity and defence matters, which would be mutually beneficial for all parties, 
cannot be taken for granted. 
Ongoing dialogue  
Despite the difficulties, this kind of dialogue between the EU and its Medi-
terranean Partners is advancing little by little, within the first basket of the 
Barcelona process. In November 2004, Senior Officials of the EMP re-
sponsible for political and security issues held a meeting co-chaired by the 
Presidency of the EU Political and Security Committee (PSC) on ESDP. At 
The Hague Euro-Mediterranean Conference, the Ministers for Foreign Af-Martin Ortega 
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fairs adopted conclusions on ESDP dialogue, terrorism and Weapons of 
Mass Destruction (WMD). In January 2005, the second meeting of the EU 
Military Staff with military points of contact of Mediterranean partners 
took place in Brussels. On 1 March 2005, Senior Officials of the EMP re-
sponsible for political and security issues discussed partnership-building 
measures, including civil protection and a proposed Euro-Med seminar on 
anti-personnel landmines. In April 2005, Senior Officials of the EMP re-
sponsible for political and security issues held another meeting co-chaired 
by the EU PSC Presidency on ESDP. On 31 May, the Luxemburg Euro-
Mediterranean conference of Foreign Ministers confirmed those develop-
ments. Most recently, on 27 June 2005, a seminar on civilian and military 
crisis management for practitioners took place in Athens .
1 
It is worthy to remember some of the most important references to the dia-
logue in security and defence fields. The 6
th Euro-Mediterranean Confer-
ence held in Naples on 2-3 December 2003, referred to dialogue and 
possible cooperation on ESDP issues.  
31. The Ministers welcomed the launching of dialogue and co-operation on 
ESDP (European Security and Defence Policy), confirming that the dialogue 
with the EU Political and Security Committee, and at expert level, can usefully 
add to the range of instruments available under the Barcelona Process. They also 
stressed that this dialogue should help to familiarise the Mediterranean partners 
with ESDP aims and instruments, with a view to their eventual, possible coop-
eration in ESDP activities on a regional, sub-regional or country basis. They re-
called that some of the Mediterranean partners already work with the EU in 
peacekeeping activities (Balkans, Africa) under the UN aegis. The Ministers ex-
pressed their belief that further complementary measures, such as civilian crisis 
management training; co-operation among civil protection authorities, particu-
larly continuing cooperation on a project on disaster management, drawing on 
the experience of the on-going pilot project, subject to satisfactory evaluation of 
its results, would constitute a significant addition to partnership building. 
Also, the Naples Euro-Med conference continued to support cooperation in 
the fight against terrorism: 
 
1  All data are taken from the publication Euromed Synopsis, available at 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/euromed/publication.htm.  The Euro-Mediterranean Dialogue and CSDP 
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30. The Ministers reaffirmed their commitment to fight terrorism in all its forms 
and manifestations wherever and by whomsoever committed. They stressed their 
engagement in the full implementation inter alia of UNSCR 1373. They also 
mandated Senior Officials to further the dialogue on terrorism, including ad hoc 
meetings, with a view to increasing co-operation in this field. According to that 
vision, the Ministers reiterated that co-operation on terrorism will be pursued 
under existing and future regional and bilateral programmes for training and 
technical assistance to improve the capability to fight terrorism as well as other 
forms of organised crime without prejudice to respect for human rights and de-
mocracy. 
This aspect of Euro-Med cooperation was reinforced after the terrorist at-
tacks in Madrid on 11 March 2004. The Dublin mid-term conference of 
Ministers of Foreign Affairs, held on 5-6 May 2004, concluded: 
35. Cooperation should be intensified both at regional level and bilaterally. In 
the latter context, Ministers mandated the Justice and Security sub-committees 
existing or currently being established under the Association Agreements to take 
forward such joint activities at expert level with the aim of improving and assist-
ing the development of counter-terrorism standards and capabilities. The fight 
against terrorism should also be pursued in the framework of the Action Plans to 
be agreed under the ENP. 
36. Ministers also noted that the informal Ad Hoc Senior Officials and experts’ 
meeting on Terrorism on 21 April concentrated on an exchange of views on the 
possibility of engaging in operational joint activities. 
Similarly, the Euro-Med conference on 29-30 November 2004 in The 
Hague, under the Netherlands EU Presidency, mentioned specific measures 
in the fight against terrorism. 
20. The EU and some countries of the region, particularly Morocco, Algeria and 
Tunisia, have stepped up the dialogue and co-operation on counter-terrorism, 
which could be extended to other Partners. Cooperation should be developed us-
ing a comprehensive approach based on international commitments leading to 
concrete activities in the fight against terrorism, notably by preventing the fi-
nancing of terrorism, as well as a dialogue on the underlying factors relating to 
the recruitment for terrorism. Such cooperation should respect and further the 
rule of law, human rights and political participation. In this regard, Ministers 
noted Egypt’s initiative concerning the organisation of an international confer-
ence on terrorism and Tunisia’s proposal for a code of conduct on the fight 
against terrorism. Ministers welcomed progress in the co-operation in the field Martin Ortega 
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of counter terrorism through the holding of an ad hoc meeting on the 10th of 
November 2004 in Brussels, on terrorism that underlined the importance of this 
global approach. 
In addition to ESDP issues and the fight against terrorism, the Dublin Euro-
Med conference on 4-5 May 2004, under the Irish EU presidency, retrieved 
another topic for the Euro-Mediterranean agenda: the fight against prolif-
eration of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). 
37. Ministers instructed Senior Officials to explore possibilities for enhancing 
dialogue and cooperation on non-proliferation issues, in particular in order to 
promote universal adherence and effective compliance with all relevant multilat-
eral agreements, and the implementation of effective export/end use control 
policies. The development of a cooperative mechanism should be examined, as 
well as the designation of points of contact between Euro-Mediterranean part-
ners. On the EU side, the Personal Representative of HR Solana could assist in 
this process. The final objective should remain a mutually and effectively verifi-
able Middle East Zone free of weapons of mass destruction, nuclear, chemical 
and biological, and their means of delivery, as set out in the Barcelona declara-
tion. 
All these developments were welcomed by the European Council of 17 De-
cember 2004. The progress report on ESDP approved by the European 
Council contains explicit references to Euro-Mediterranean dialogue and 
cooperation. 
36. Further progress was made in strengthening dialogue and co-operation on 
ESDP with Mediterranean partners. More concretely, Turkey and Morocco are 
participating in the EU military operation ALTHEA. The PSC reviewed the im-
plementation of modalities for dialogue and co-operation with Mediterranean 
partners and agreement was reached on the format of the ESDP dialogue be-
tween EU Member States and Mediterranean partners in the framework of the 
Barcelona process. 
37. The Euro-Med Senior Officials meeting on ESDP, co-chaired by the Chair-
man of the PSC, was held in November, at which recent developments in ESDP 
and possibilities and modalities for co-operation were discussed. This format for 
developing dialogue and co-operation between the EU and Mediterranean part-
ners proved to be fruitful. Furthermore, a meeting was organised by EUMS with 
the military points of contact of Mediterranean partners. A PSC report on dia-
logue and co-operation with Mediterranean partners on ESDP was presented to 
the Euro-Med Ministerial meeting in The Hague on 29-30 November resulting in The Euro-Mediterranean Dialogue and CSDP 
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agreement that the dialogue should be pursued and should gradually lead to 
agreed activities. 
In spite of the ongoing dialogue, some questions are still pertinent: What is 
the purpose of the Euro-Mediterranean dialogue on security and defence 
matters? How can the various security perceptions across the Mediterra-
nean be taken into account? Should this dialogue be translated into action, 
through specific cooperation measures? Should it focus on ESDP or should 
it be broader? What kind of specific measures can be envisaged? In a 
changing international environment, what is the added value of dialogue 
and cooperation on those issues in the Euro-Mediterranean area? 
Political context and participation 
The substance of the Euro-Med dialogue in security and defence matters is 
the common denominator agreed by all partners. Its purpose, thus, will be 
defined in a consensual and dynamic manner. In 1995, no one could have 
foreseen the current status of the Euro-Mediterranean dialogue on security 
and defence issues, and it seems now similarly impossible to predict the 
shape of this dialogue in 2015. Summing up the documents quoted above, 
in the last few months the following items have been discussed in the Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership: 
•  Transparency and briefings on ESDP; 
•  Co-operation in civil protection and disaster management; 
•  Participation in UN-mandated, EU-led peace operations; 
•  The fight against terrorism and organised crime. 
This list already gives a clear idea of the purpose of the dialogue so far, and 
demonstrates that the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership has recently adopted 
a pragmatic approach vis-à-vis security and defence issues. Whether other 
issues will be agreed between the parties in the future remains to be seen. 
The pragmatic approach entails defining, on a case-by-case basis, areas in 
which the partners are ready to discuss and possibly cooperate. A different 
approach would be to start from the definition of security and defence pri-Martin Ortega 
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orities amongst the Euro-Mediterranean partners, with the aim of determin-
ing specific areas of cooperation at a later stage. According to this concep-
tual approach, a Euro-Mediterranean security concept should be drafted in 
the first place. Just as NATO agreed on a New Strategic Concept in April 
1999, and as the EU adopted a European Security Strategy in December 
2003, the Euro-Mediterranean partners should – following this approach – 
prepare a common concept. Given the differences between the EU’s Medi-
terranean partners, however, this seems a challenging prospect.  
Indeed, one main obstacle would be the lack of an overall settlement be-
tween Israel and its Arab neighbours. The current situation de facto ham-
pers progress in multilateral schemes such as the Barcelona Process as well 
as possible sub-regional cooperation in the Eastern Mediterranean. The 
EU’s Arab EMP partners have continuously underlined that the dialogue on 
security and defence issues should be understood in the broader political 
context. Nevertheless, the fact that some measures have been identified and 
implemented in spite of the political obstacles is a very positive develop-
ment, beneficial for all partners. It is doubtful that blocking the Euro-Med 
dialogue on security and defence issues would (a) alter or toughen the EU’s 
stance vis-à-vis the various disputes, or (b) improve one or the other par-
ties’ respective positions. As regards the EU, it maintains a balanced point 
of view and seeks a peaceful resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as 
well as other aspects of the Israeli-Arab dispute. 
On the other hand, difficulties persist in the relationships between Arab 
countries. It must be remembered in this connection that some of the Medi-
terranean Partners do not enjoy peaceful and constructive relations between 
themselves. All in all, the political obstacles affect the conceptual approach 
(defining common Euro-Med concepts of conflict prevention, security or 
stability) more than the pragmatic approach. If the latter is pursued, current 
measures as well as other measures discussed below can be gradually iden-
tified and put into practice.  
  On the other hand, the question of whether the dialogue should be 
pursued in a multilateral, sub-regional or bilateral framework is crucial. 
The Euro-Mediterranean dialogue and cooperation on security and defence The Euro-Mediterranean Dialogue and CSDP 
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issues can be organised (1) multilaterally, if all members of the Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership participate, (2) within a sub-regional frame-
work, or (3) bilaterally, i.e. EU-individual Mediterranean partners. The lat-
est Euro-Mediterranean conferences (Naples, Dublin and The Hague, but 
also the Crete mid-term Conference in May 2003) have opened the door to 
all three types of dialogue and cooperation. For instance, the Naples con-
ference mentioned ‘possible cooperation in ESDP activities on a regional, 
sub-regional or country basis.’ After referring to partnership-building 
measures, the conclusions of the same Naples conference added: ‘If neces-
sary such measures could be on the basis of participation by a limited num-
ber of partners, open to others to join later.’ 
The notion that the three formats of dialogue and cooperation are mutually 
exclusive must be rejected, since some activities (transparency-building, 
for instance) might be multilateral, while others (specific cooperation 
schemes) can be sub-regional or bilateral. The challenge will be non-
discrimination within the partnership. This means that all partners should 
be entitled to participate in all activities, although implementation of this 
principle may give rise to intricate practical problems. In this context, on 
21 December 2004, an important initiative took place in the Western Medi-
terranean, when Ministers of Defence of the 5 + 5 Group
2 met and decided 
to launch cooperation at sub-regional level. Ministers of Defence declared: 
Nous souhaitons mener cette Initiative dans le but de renforcer la compréhension 
mutuelle comme mesure de confiance et de nous permettre de gérer les problè-
mes concernant la sécurité. 
Nous considérons que le but de cette Initiative est de promouvoir des activités 
pratiques de coopération dans les domaines d’intérêt commun pour servir de 
point de rencontre pour partager nos expériences et nos connaissances. 
Fields of cooperation included in the first annual working programme 
(contribution des ministères de la défense à la surveillance maritime en 
Méditerranée, à la protection civile, et à la sécurité aérienne en Méditer-
 
2  The 5 + 5 Group members are Algeria, France, Italy, Libya, Malta, Mauritania, Mo-
rocco, Portugal, Spain and Tunisia. Public information on this initiative is available 
at: http://www.defense.gouv.fr/sites/defense/actualites_et_dossiers/reunion_inter 
ministerielle_55.  Martin Ortega 
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ranée) indicate the Ministries of Defence’s willingness to deepen collabo-
ration between them. Although a direct link has not been established (Libya 
and Mauritania are not members of the EMP), the initiative is compatible 
with the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, and could be replicated in other 
Mediterranean sub-regions. Indeed, it can be argued, the 5 + 5 Ministers of 
Defence initiative shares the spirit of the Barcelona process. 
Institutional coherence within the EU and coordination 
with NATO’s Mediterranean dialogue 
Coherence between the Barcelona Process and the European Neighbour-
hood Policy has improved but continues to be a matter of concern for some 
observers. The first Action Plans adopted in December 2004 (including 
those agreed with Israel, Jordan, Morocco, the Palestinian Authority and 
Tunisia) refer to security and defence issues as well as to ESDP in dissimi-
lar terms. Better intra-European coordination is also desirable with regard 
to bilateral (i.e. EU member states-Mediterranean partners) activities, on 
the one hand, and EMP multilateral activities, on the other. A solution that 
may be envisaged is the creation of an inventory of bilateral and multilat-
eral meetings and measures, where both EU members and institutions and 
Mediterranean partners could have access to all activities carried out at the 
various levels. On a voluntary basis, EU member states and Mediterranean 
partners could communicate a general description of the relevant activities, 
which would constitute a useful record of Euro-Mediterranean dialogue on 
security and defence issues. 
In the longer term, a future possibility would be the creation of a Euro-
Mediterranean institution dealing with information (and studies) on secu-
rity and defence issues, but this idea depends on a broader decision on in-
stitutionalisation of the Barcelona Process. Finally, better coordination is 
equally required between Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Ministries of 
Defence not only in Europe but also in all EMP partners. 
The Euro-Mediterranean dialogue on security and defence issues, including 
on ESDP, and NATO’s Mediterranean dialogue are compatible and will 
surely be pursued in the coming months and years. Transparency, informa-The Euro-Mediterranean Dialogue and CSDP 
  33
tion and partnership on security and military issues are so badly needed in 
the Mediterranean that both the EU’s and NATO’s efforts in this respect 
will continue in the foreseeable future. Both organisations need to explain 
to their respective Mediterranean partners who they are, what they are ac-
tually doing and what they intend to do. NATO has recently enhanced its 
Mediterranean activities at the Istanbul summit in June 2004,
3 whereas, at 
the same time, the EU and the EMP are also upgrading the Euro-
Mediterranean dialogue and activities on security and defence matters. 
Bearing in mind that the EU and NATO cooperate effectively on security 
and defence issues (they have established a productive working relationship 
for crisis management under the ‘Berlin-Plus’ mechanism), their respective 
Mediterranean activities could be coordinated in one way or another. Two 
schools of thought exist on this issue. Firstly, some actors and observers 
believe that both dialogues should continue in parallel. Coordination is 
made de facto through exchange of information and participation. For in-
stance, the EU and NATO usually invite officials from the other organisa-
tion to seminars and other transparency-building measures, and the same 
state officials participate in the various activities. Secondly, others think 
that the EU and NATO authorities, in agreement with Mediterranean part-
ners, should decide upon the political guidelines for conducting both dia-
logues. This would allow for the appropriate division of labour between the 
two dialogues, which might be needed when it comes to undertaking con-
crete activities. The seminar is a good opportunity to explore advantages 
and disadvantages of both options. 
It seems that coordination between the EMP and the Council of Europe’s 
and OSCE’s Mediterranean activities do not raise major issues. Finally, it 
must be pointed out that the EU is developing a strategic partnership with 
the United Nations,
4 particularly for peacekeeping purposes, and is collabo-
 
3  See general information on the enhanced NATO Mediterranean dialogue and the 
Istanbul Cooperation Initiative at http://www.nato.int/med-dial/home.htm.  
4  See Martin Ortega (ed) The EU and the United Nations. Partners in effective multi-
lateralism, EU ISS Chaillot Paper N. 78, June 2005, available at http://www.iss-
eu.org/chaillot/chai78.pdf; and general information on EU-UN cooperation at 
http://ue.eu.int/cms3_fo/showPage.asp?id=403&lang=en&mode=g.  Martin Ortega 
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rating with the African Union for crisis management.
5 For instance, the 
EU’s Africa Peace Facility has funded AMIS, the African Union Mission 
in Sudan with 92 million euros. The EU also maintains an informal dia-
logue with the Arab League. On 22 March 2005, Javier Solana, the EU 
High Representative, participated in the Arab League’s 60
th anniversary 
summit in Algiers. 
Specific cooperation measures 
The Euro-Mediterranean dialogue in this area includes a number of specific 
activities, which will be examined briefly: 
1.  Transparency-building 
2.  Civil protection 
3.  Participation in peace operations 
4.  Partnership-building measures. 
5.  The fight against terrorism and organised crime 
6.  Weapons of Mass Destruction 
1. Transparency-building 
As a first stage, the main purpose of the Euro-Mediterranean dialogue on 
security and defence matters has been exchange of information, notably on 
ESDP, and transparency. In general terms, international rapprochement re-
garding security and defence issues has been classified as follows: trans-
parency-building measures, partnership-building measures, confidence-
building measures, and military cooperation, in a continuum from the lower 
to the higher end of the spectrum of possible cooperation. This was the 
case, for instance, during the long CSCE/OSCE process launched in 1975 
by the Helsinki Final Act.  
 
5  On the EU’s involvement in crisis management in Africa, see 
http://ue.eu.int/cms3_fo/showPage.asp?id=400&lang=en&mode=g.  The Euro-Mediterranean Dialogue and CSDP 
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Even if in the Euro-Mediterranean area the levels of confidence-building 
measures and military cooperation have not been reached multilaterally, a 
great deal of progress has been made in the space of a decade. Dialogue 
and transparency on security and defence issues were almost non-existent 
across the Mediterranean (with the exception of some bilateral relations) 
until the 1990s. NATO, OSCE and the WEU started their respective Medi-
terranean dialogues in the mid-1990s. After having acquired a new security 
and defence dimension in the late 1990s, the European Union is also in-
volved in an effort to clarify what its security and defence policy is and to 
understand the Mediterranean partners’ security concerns. Utilising the 
well-established framework of the Barcelona Process, dialogue and trans-
parency on security and defence issues within the EMP are proving very 
useful, for they ensure mutual comprehension of the various interlocutors’ 
priorities, and promote regular exchanges amongst the diplomatic, military, 
politico-military and political authorities. 
Transparency has been carried out (a) via briefings and meetings in the 
EMP context, and (b) via seminars. Briefings and meetings on ESDP, or-
ganised by the EU PSC and later held within the EMP, have been facili-
tated after the nomination of Mediterranean Partners’ military points of 
contact in Brussels. As regards seminars, following the Valencia Euro-
Mediterranean Conference, the Spanish EU Presidency and CIDOB organ-
ised a first seminar on the ESDP and the Mediterranean in Barcelona in 
May 2002. Thereafter, Greece organised a seminar in Rhodes in November 
2002 and another in Corfu in May 2003, and the Italian EU Presidency fol-
lowed suit. A number of institutes in EU member states, including the 
German  Bundesakademie für Sicherheitspolitik, the Italian CEMISS, the 
Spanish CIDOB, the French IHEDN, the British RUSI, and the Swedish 
National Defence College,
6 have held seminars and prepared publications 
on security and the EMP. The Ministries of Defence have been deeply in-
volved in these activities. The utility of those seminars is obvious, for they 
offer an opportunity to examine security and defence issues with experts, 
 
6  See the publication Bo Huldt et al. (eds.), Euro-Mediterranean Security and the Bar-
celona Process, Swedish National Defence College- Strategic Yearbook 2003, 
Stockholm, 2002. Martin Ortega 
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diplomats and high-ranking military officers from the EU members and 
Mediterranean partners, and provide for a debate on such issues multilater-
ally and frankly.  
Greece and the EU Council Secretariat-General organised a comprehensive 
seminar to share views on civilian and military crisis management amongst 
all the EMP partners in Athens at the end of June 2005. Also, the EU Insti-
tute for Security Studies distributes its publications in all the EU’s Mediter-
ranean partners and invites experts and officials to seminars on issues of 
common interest, such as for instance a conference held in October 2004 on 
the relationship between the EU and the Maghreb countries, and a seminar 
on the security and defence dimension of the Barcelona process on 10 May 
2005.
7 
In transparency-building activities, the problem of the receiving end on 
both sides of the Mediterranean should be analysed. Current measures 
mainly involve Mediterranean connoisseurs, be it academics, diplomats or 
military officers. Visits to EU institutions in Brussels and elsewhere (e.g., 
the EU Satellite Centre)
8 can be very helpful. But if mutual knowledge is to 
be expanded, it would be useful to widen the audience. For instance, some 
transparency-building activities could be organised in Mediterranean part-
ners’ capitals, in cooperation with local institutions, in order to involve 
academic institutions, think tanks, the civil society and the press. Finally, 
transparency-building raises the problem of reciprocity, which could also 
be considered during the seminar. 
2. Civil protection  
The Euro-Med Partnership is dealing with two projects in this domain. 
Firstly, following a proposal by Egypt and Italy back in 1996, the Senior 
Officials agreed to endorse a Pilot project for the creation of a Euro-
Mediterranean system of mitigation, prevention and management of natural 
and man-made disasters. Algeria and France later joined Egypt and Italy as 
 
7  Both seminars’ full reports are available at www.iss-eu.org. The Euro-Mediterranean Dialogue and CSDP 
  37
lead states. The project, which has received support from all the 35 part-
ners, is based on the common interest in fighting natural and man-made 
risks and hazards, i.e. earthquakes, floods, forest fires, urban risk manage-
ment and maritime risk management. For each of these situations, four 
main types of actions can be undertaken: training and information courses 
and seminars; exchange of experts; networking of Civil Protection Schools; 
and short-term technical assistance. Earthquakes, for example, can strike 
many territories across the Mediterranean. In addition to multilateral coop-
eration, riparian Mediterranean states actively collaborate between them-
selves, as Greece and Turkey do, for instance. 
According to Pedro Courela, a Portuguese academic, one of the main les-
sons that can be drawn so far from the pilot project is that ‘through the 
various training courses and seminars and the exchange of experts, the pro-
gramme allowed the networking among practitioners from all the partici-
pating countries.’
 9 Another lesson would be: ‘The practical nature of civil 
protection co-operation underlines the pro-active approach that was largely 
a feature of the Barcelona Declaration. In other words, such a project 
shows that the EMP does not have to be solely a dialogue, but that partner-
ship can also mean running common projects to address common chal-
lenges.’  
Secondly, the possibility of establishing an early warning system for tsu-
nami-type waves, originated by earthquakes, in the Mediterranean has been 
recently analysed at ad hoc Euro-Med Senior Officials meetings. 
3. Participation in peace operations 
The ESDP provides the Union an operational capacity drawing on civil and 
military assets to launch missions for peacekeeping and conflict prevention 
 
8  The German presidency of the WEU organised a visit to the Satellite Centre for 
Mediterranean partners in December 1997. On the WEU Mediterranean dialogue, see 
WEU Rome Declaration, 16-17 November 1998. 
9  Pedro Courela, ‘Civil Protection as a Euro-Mediterranean Project: the case for prac-
tical co-operation’, Euromesco Papers  No.  34,  August  2004,  at  http://www.            
euromesco.net/imgupload/paper34_final.pdf.  Martin Ortega 
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in cooperation with the United Nations.
10 There is no EU ‘unified military’ 
or ‘European army’, for the ESDP tasks are undertaken using capabilities 
provided by the member states. So far, the EU has conducted a number of 
military, police and rule of law operations, in application of UN Security 
Council resolutions, on which the EU has informed its Mediterranean Part-
ners regularly.
11 
EU Operation Althea was undertaken on 2 December 2004, to ensure sta-
bility in Bosnia and Herzegovina in accordance with UNSC Resolution 
1575 of 22 November 2004. Turkey participates in this Operation, as a 
NATO member, through the existing arrangements between EU and 
NATO. Morocco also takes part following an agreement signed by the EU 
and Morocco on 2 February 2005.
12 Morocco contributes a significant con-
tingent of 130 troops, and this experience is considered to be mutually ad-
vantageous for both the EU and Morocco. The possibility of expanding this 
type of teamwork to other Mediterranean partners and utilising it for other 
EU operations (for instance, in RDC) can be discussed during the seminar. 
Euro-Med cooperation in peace operations can also be envisaged differ-
ently, for there is a whole range of conceivable formats. A Moroccan-
Spanish contingent is participating in the Brazilian-led operation in Haiti, 
in application of UNSC Resolution 1542. Some analysts have floated the 
idea of mounting NATO-led or EU-led peace operations in the Middle East 
with contributions from Mediterranean partners.
13  
 
 
 
10  An overview on ESDP can be found in Nicole Gnesotto (ed), EU Security and De-
fence Policy. The first five years (1999-2004), EU ISS, Paris, 2004. English, 
French, German, Italian and Spanish versions are available at http://www.iss-
eu.org/public/content/bookse.html.  
11  General information on past and current ESDP operations is available at 
http://ue.eu.int/cms3_fo/showPage.asp?id=268&lang=en&mode=g.  
12  Jordan and Morocco already contributed to the NATO SFOR operation, from 
which Althea took over.  
13  See, for instance, Israel Elad Altman, ‘Damaskus, der große Unruhestifter’, in Die 
Zeit, 17 February 2005. The Euro-Mediterranean Dialogue and CSDP 
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4. Partnership-building measures 
It is generally accepted that partnership-building measures within the Bar-
celona Process have a positive impact on the EMP’s political and security 
chapter and, therefore – it can be argued – on the future development of a 
Euro-Mediterranean dialogue on security and defence issues. At The Hague 
Euro-Med Conference, ‘Ministers encouraged the Commission to continue 
support for Partnership Building Measures, i.e. the Malta Diplomatic 
Seminars, co-operation in Civil Protection and Disaster Management and 
the EUROMESCO network of foreign policy institutes. Ministers wel-
comed the progress report on Partnership Building Measures under the co-
ordination of Italy and Jordan.’ Other areas for possible cooperation have 
also been mentioned (land de-mining, maritime safety, and the environ-
ment) as is mentioned below. 
5. The fight against terrorism and organised crime 
In addition to those areas of dialogue and cooperation, some other aspects 
of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership are related to security and, there-
fore, could be also considered. As EU documents point out, the fight 
against terrorism has become an integral part of the EU’s external relations. 
Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) external measures to combat terrorism 
have manifested themselves at the multilateral level, through political co-
operation and dialogue, and in support to third countries to improve their 
counter-terrorism capacities. Counter-terrorism clauses are also systemati-
cally included in agreements with third countries. The EU equally has an 
extensive track record in providing JHA assistance, through such pro-
grammes as CARDS, MEDA, PHARE and TACIS, to support the efforts of 
third countries to comply with key multilateral instruments (particularly 
UNSC Resolution 1373) in such priority areas as: border management; po-
lice cooperation; judicial capacity building and combating terrorist financ-
ing. 
Senior Officials of the EMP responsible for political and security issues 
have discussed cooperation in the fight against terrorism. The Dublin and 
The Hague Euro-Mediterranean Conferences (paragraphs quoted above) Martin Ortega 
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referred to this cooperation in some detail. Implementing the 2002 Valencia 
Action Plan, the Commission has encouraged regional and bilateral coop-
eration in this field, as the recent Commission document ‘Regional and bi-
lateral MEDA cooperation in the area of justice, freedom and security’ 
shows.
14 The various MEDA-funded programmes include improving co-
operation between police forces in areas such as organised crime and inter-
national terrorism and judicial sector reform. The Euro-Mediterranean Ad 
Hoc Group on Terrorism has proceeded with intense work on this area, in-
cluding cooperation in combating drugs, organised crime and terrorism, 
and cooperation on migration and movement of persons. Both the European 
Commission and the Council have played a crucial role in assisting Euro-
Mediterranean officials, and three specific proposals have been identified: 
training of magistrates, training of police and cooperation in the phenome-
non of migration.  
6. Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) 
Another subject that draws the attention of all EMP partners is Weapons of 
Mass Destruction. As the Commission Communication in preparation for 
the 10
th anniversary of the Barcelona Process puts it, ‘the EU is working 
with Mediterranean partners to attain the objectives enshrined in the Barce-
lona Declaration of a Mediterranean region free of weapons of mass de-
struction and that all countries of the region fully comply with and 
implement their international obligations in this area. These objectives are 
contained in the 
Association Agreement initialled with Syria and in the Neighbourhood Ac-
tion Plans.’
 15  
With the aim of examining all related issues, the EU CFSP High Represen-
tative Javier Solana’s Personal Envoy on WMD proliferation, Annalisa 
 
14  Euromed Information Note No. 86, dated 01 March 2005 gives a complete view on 
this issue: http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/euromed/publication/2005/ 
report_86.pdf.  
15  Commission Communication dated 12 April 2005, available at 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/euromed/publication/2005/report_89_
en.pdf.  The Euro-Mediterranean Dialogue and CSDP 
  41
Giannella, has proposed that a Euro-Mediterranean workshop on this sub-
ject, which would take place in 2005, should be held. Indeed, in order to 
advance the Barcelona Declaration’s objectives in this respect, the EU is 
proposing to use the MEDA programme to support the implementation of 
WMD-related commitments, and cooperate in the Euro-Mediterranean con-
text in particular as regards export, transit and end-use controls as well as 
enforcement procedures. 
Prospects for the future 
In preparation for the Barcelona Euro-Mediterranean Conference that will 
celebrate the 10
th anniversary of the process in Barcelona in November 
2005, the Foreign Ministers of the 35 EMP partners will have to decide 
whether and how current dialogue and cooperation on security and defence 
issues should be carried on, and whether fresh areas for dialogue and coop-
eration are ripe to receive a new impulse.  
Concerning current measures, it would be desirable to improve their ration-
alisation and visibility through the definition of an annual list of activities, 
which could be drafted jointly by all EMP partners.
 16 Equally, an inventory 
of past and present dialogue and cooperation activities could be created. 
This catalogue would contain a short description of multilateral, sub-
regional and bilateral measures, showing that one of the main characteris-
tics of Euro-Mediterranean initiatives in the security and defence domain is 
transparency – and also facilitating coordination with other international 
organisations’ Mediterranean dialogues. The third session of the seminar 
will be a good opportunity to discuss these ideas. 
As far as new measures are concerned, cooperation on training for civilian 
and military crisis management is a task that the partners could take on as a 
matter of priority. Dialogue and cooperation on land de-mining, a theme 
recently proposed by Belgium, constitutes a very interesting prospect, es-
pecially concerning remnants of land mines and ordnance from the Second Martin Ortega 
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World War. Dialogue on this issue should result in enhancement of the Ot-
tawa Convention’s multilateral regime on land mines. Cooperation for 
maritime and aerial safety in the Mediterranean has already been men-
tioned in the 5 + 5 Group initiative of December 2004; introduction of this 
issue into the EMP could also be examined. As regards protection of the 
Mediterranean environment, the EMP could make an important contribu-
tion, even if it should be made in coordination with existing multilateral 
schemes such as the UNEP Mediterranean Action Plan, the Plan Bleu and 
the MCSD.
17  
More ambitious seems the establishment of military confidence-building 
measures and military cooperation. However, nothing stands on the way of 
discussing the creation of multinational forces between Mediterranean 
partners and between European and Mediterranean partners in the future.  
Pursuing current areas of dialogue and cooperation as well as defining new 
areas will none the less encounter serious challenges. Some are related to 
the EU itself, some are based on the very nature of the Mediterranean re-
gion and some are linked to the transatlantic relationship and the role of the 
United States in the region. 
First, the EU and its member states should realise that effective engage-
ment in the Mediterranean and the Middle East requires a lot of resources 
and political energy in a long-term, sustained effort. National positions 
vary greatly in this respect. The EU enlargement to ten new members in 
2004 has arguably moved the ‘centre of gravity’ eastwards and northwards. 
At the same time, some of the key contributors to the EU budget are insist-
ing that this budget should be limited at the time of establishing the next 
financial perspectives. On the other hand, the suspension of the ratification 
process following the French and Dutch referendums opens an uncertain 
period in Europe. Bearing in mind all these developments, it remains to be 
seen whether the EU will be able to allocate the necessary resources to the 
 
16  This idea was floated in a seminar organised by the EU ISS under the EU Italian 
Presidency in September 2003. See report of the seminar at http://www.iss-
eu.org/activ/content/rep03-9.pdf.  
17  General information on these schemes can be found at http://www.planbleu 
.org/indexa.htm.  The Euro-Mediterranean Dialogue and CSDP 
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Mediterranean region. The EU Mediterranean partners’ preoccupations 
concerning the funding of the security and defence dialogue and coopera-
tion are, thus, most pertinent. If the EU is convinced of the utility of this 
dialogue, it should be ready to meet costs. 
Second, the political and economic development of the southern Mediter-
ranean states will not be trouble-free. The Commission Communication in 
preparation for the 10
th anniversary of the Barcelona Process, quoted 
above, puts the accent on democratisation, good governance and human 
rights. However, it is obvious that the relationship between democracy, on 
the one hand, and security and stability, on the other, might be contradic-
tory in some cases. Truly democratic elections in some Mediterranean part-
ners might lead to social unrest in the countries concerned, and anti-
European or anti-Western governments, at least for some time. Even so, as 
most analysts point out, continuous support for democracy, good govern-
ance and human rights should be a Euro-Mediterranean priority. One area 
where good governance and security interact, security sector reform and 
security sector governance,
18 might be subject to examination within the 
EMP. 
Third, the Euromesco report entitled ‘Barcelona plus: Towards a Euro-
Mediterranean community of democratic states’
19 of February 2005 rightly 
underlines that efforts towards joint ownership of the process should con-
tinue. All EMP members’ security perceptions and priorities should be 
taken into account.
20 This issue is linked with the prospect of institutionali-
sation of the EMP. As the Euromesco report puts it, ‘reform of the current 
institutional design must address the North/South asymmetry and thus de-
 
18  See Fred Tanner, ‘Security governance: the difficult task of security democratisa-
tion in the Mediterranean’, Euromesco Brief No. 4, April 2003, at 
http://www.euromesco.net/imgupload/eurbrief4final.pdf.  
19  Euromesco report, Barcelona Plus: towards a Euro-Mediterranean community of 
democratic states,  February  2005,  available  at  http://www.euromesco.net/            
imgupload/euromescorep_barcplus_en.pdf.  
20  Useful contributions in this respect are: Alvaro Vasconcelos, ‘Launching the Euro-
Mediterranean Security and Defence Dialogue’ (Euromesco Brief No. 7, January 
2004), and Gamal Soltan, ‘Southern Mediterranean Perceptions and Proposals for 
Mediterranean Security’ (Euromesco Brief No. 8, February 2004). Martin Ortega 
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vise ways to engage Southern partners actively in the administration of the 
Barcelona process. A choice should be finally made between intentional 
under-institutionalization of the Partnership … and the creation of new 
Euro-Mediterranean institutions, be they sectorial or with a transversal 
competence, in order to improve the visibility and credibility of the Barce-
lona process.’   
Fourth, the situation in the Middle East still represents a difficult political 
environment, which affects the most sensitive aspects of the Barcelona 
process such as the political and security dialogue. Two recent develop-
ments are worth mentioning: the Israeli ‘Gaza disengagement plan’ and the 
Syrian decision to withdraw its forces from Lebanon. However, these de-
velopments should be part of a broader process: the Israeli move must be 
accompanied by further implementation of the Quartet’s Roadmap, and 
Lebanon must go through a peaceful political process to the end. If events 
follow this path, the political atmosphere in the region would improve. 
Otherwise, well-known protracted disputes will continue to impede re-
gional rapprochement in the Eastern Mediterranean. Those disputes equally 
are one of the main obstacles that get in the way to the definition of Euro-
Mediterranean security concepts and the adoption of a Mediterranean Char-
ter for Peace and Stability.  
Finally, the Iraq crisis continues to cast its long shadow over transatlantic 
relations and over the United States’s stance in the Arab world. Admittedly, 
since the President George W. Bush’s visit to Europe in February 2005, the 
language has changed and the EU has established a rule of law mission to 
help Iraq rebuild its security and armed forces. However, the necessary po-
litical synergy between the United States, the European Union and the 
Middle East actors has not been found.
21 The long vicious circle of vio-
lence in the region should be transformed into a virtuous triangle, but the 
moment has not unfortunately come yet. As a matter of fact, American and 
European efforts for the promotion of democracy and development in the 
broader Middle East, despite their common objectives, do not always coin-
 
21  See Ludger Kühnhardt & Samuel Wells, The Crisis in Transatlantic Relations, ZEI 
Working Paper C 143, Bonn 2005. The Euro-Mediterranean Dialogue and CSDP 
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cide. Lack of coordination between the EU’s and NATO’s Mediterranean 
activities can, for instance, be interpreted in this light.  Andreas Marchetti 
Promoting Good Governance 
The Keystone to a Sustainable Mediterranean Policy 
When in 1995 the EU agreed on the establishment of the Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership, it did so because the end of the bipolar world 
order had changed international relations substantially, giving way to a re-
surfacing of the regional level – in positive as well as in negative terms. 
Whereas the EC countries themselves progressed towards a more integrated 
regional setting with the Maastricht Treaty and thereby establishing the 
European Union, Europeans witnessed also the collapse of Yugoslavia and 
had to realize their helplessness vis-à-vis this process. From this the con-
viction grew steadily that the EU needed to establish closer ties with coun-
tries in its vicinity in order to maybe prevent or at least weaken the 
negative repercussions of similar developments as witnessed in Yugoslavia. 
However, back in 1995, the necessity to create a framework for the EU’s 
relations with countries around the Mediterranean was almost exclusively 
articulated by Southern EU members that felt more directly concerned by 
developments in the region than other EU countries. Besides, the Mediter-
ranean EU members identified early the issues that were to become virulent 
as for example the danger of increasing religious extremism.
1 The policies 
finally established within the EMP reflected these concerns and were 
grouped under three partnerships: Political and Security Partnership, Eco-
nomic and Financial Partnership, and Social and Cultural Partnership. The 
 
The author thanks Thomas Demmelhuber for his valuable comments on the manuscript. 
1  Cf. Ministère de la Défense: Livre Blanc sur la Défense, Paris 1994, p. 18. Andreas Marchetti 
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good governance agenda was integrated in the Political and Security Part-
nership. 
The Promotion of Good Governance within the EMP 
Framework – A Brief Account 
The Barcelona Declaration
2 has been quite clear about the importance EU 
member states are giving to the respective partnerships. One of the most 
pronounced priorities has been the development of “the rule of law and 
democracy” in Mediterranean Partner Countries (MPCs). It is not by acci-
dent that this topic is addressed at the beginning of the substantial text of 
the Declaration, it is rather to underline the importance associated to the 
subject. Consequently, clearer definitions of what is to be understood by 
the introductory general terms are included in the document before address-
ing issues of external security within the Political and Security Partnership. 
Details concerning the other partnerships follow even further down the 
document. 
The concrete promotion of good governance within the framework of the 
EMP is implemented by a combination of bottom-up and top-down ap-
proaches.
3 
1.  Bottom-up measures are put into practice under the MEDA Democracy 
Programme – now integrated into the European Initiative for Democ-
racy and Human Rights – with a clear preference to contract with NGOs 
rather than with public bodies for the concrete implementation at a ratio 
of 25 to 1. By doing so, the Union intends to strengthen civil society or-
ganizations within the respective countries because the activation of 
civil society is regarded as an essential prerequisite for any democratic 
development. 
2.  The top-down approach consists mainly in promoting good governance 
by engaging in direct dialogue with partners in the different forums es-
 
2  Cf. http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/euromed/bd.htm. 
3  Cf. for the following Rosa Balfour: Rethinking the Euro-Mediterranean political and 
security dialogue (ISS, Occasional Papers, 52), Paris 2004, p. 21. Promoting Good Governance 
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tablished under the EMP. This dialogue takes place on various levels, up 
to the regular conferences of ministers of foreign affairs, the highest 
body of the Barcelona Process. The inauguration of the Euro-
Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly (EMPA) in March 2004 in 
Cairo fits also in this approach and is regarded as another important step 
to intensify the dialogue on the issue of good governance since parlia-
mentarians are not necessarily government-bound and therefore re-
garded as a possible link to civil society. By the means of the EMPA the 
EU tries to connect the two approaches mentioned. 
Abilities, Performance, and Obstacles – An Evaluation 
At the outset, the EMP was basically designed as a process to create a 
framework for multilateral as well as bilateral dialogue and co-operation. 
As such, it has undoubtedly generated positive effects since it brought and 
continues to bring together very different partners and managed to maintain 
a regular dialogue even in cases of rising tensions between MPCs. Outside 
the United Nations, the EMP is still the only multilateral forum in which 
Israel and Palestinians meet as two equal members on a regular basis. By 
achieving the maintenance of such a dialogue, the EMP has been central in 
creating a better climate to implement concrete policies within the EMP’s 
three partnerships. It has also helped the EU to gain or maintain a relatively 
high level of credibility in most MPCs, an asset for its policies that cannot 
be underestimated. This point is particularly stressed if one looks at the 
credibility-gap the United States have to encounter in most parts of the re-
gion. With reference to the practice in Guantanamo, the U.S. are criticized 
for using double standards if it comes to human rights, which constitute a 
central part of the good governance agenda. Besides, many governments in 
the region regard the U.S. as an occupying power because of their engage-
ment in Iraq. These perceptions have not helped the pursuit of the good 
governance agenda in general, however, by the means of the EMP, the EU 
has managed to lessen the negative effects for its own policies – and there-
fore for the West in general. Nonetheless, looking at the concrete develop-
ment of governance in the region, the effects of any policy towards good Andreas Marchetti 
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governance – let alone democratization – have been virtually zero (Table 
1).
4 
 
Table 1: Good Governance Indicators 1995-2004. 
 1995  2000  2004 
Country PR CL Rating PR CL Rating PR CL Rating
Algeria  6 6 NF 6 5 NF 6 5 NF 
Egypt 6 6 NF 6 5 NF 6 5 NF 
Israel  1 3 F  1 3 F  1 3 F 
Jordan 4 4 PF 4 4 PF 5 4 PF 
Lebanon  6 5 NF 6 5 NF 6 5 NF 
Libya
a 7 7 NF 7 7 NF 7 7 NF 
Morocco  5 5 PF 5 4 PF 5 4 PF 
Palestine
b  - - -  - - -  - - - 
Syria  7 7 NF 7 7 NF 7 7 NF 
Tunisia  6 5 NF 6 5 NF 6 5 NF 
Turkey
c  5 5 PF 4 5 PF 3 3 PF 
Legend: PR - Political Rights; CL - Civil Liberties; F - Free; PF - Partly Free; NF - Not 
Free. The ratings go from 1 (free) to 7 (not free). 
a Libya is observer to the Barcelona Process. 
b No data available. 
c EU-Turkey relations are also governed by the Accession Partnership with the EU. 
Source: Freedom House (for 1995 and 2000 numbers: http://www.freedomhouse.org/ 
ratings/allscore04.xls; for 2004 numbers: http://www.freedomhouse.org/research/free 
world/2005/table2005.pdf). 
 
 
4  Cf. also the chapters on ‘Democratisation and Human Rights’ and ‘Civil Society’ in: 
Barcelona Plus. Towards a Euro-Mediterranean Community of Democratic States. A 
EuroMeSCo Report, Lisbon 2005, p. 22f. (available at: http://www.euromesco. net/ 
imgupload/barcelonaplus_en_fin.pdf). Promoting Good Governance 
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The marginal progress in promoting good governance in the region has led 
to a certain frustration on the European side. The unsatisfactory results in 
this area can be seen as the consequence of two strategic problems that will 
need to be overcome: 
1.  In the eyes of MPCs, the good governance agenda pursued by the EU 
seems not totally altruistic but rather designed to pursue the EU’s inter-
ests and to satisfy its security needs, whereas the partners’ concerns 
seem to play only a minor role in the Political and Security Partnership. 
This problem is due to the fact that the EU has designed the whole proc-
ess of promoting good governance too much from its own standpoint 
and has not really managed to communicate the positive effects of pur-
suing the agenda to partner governments or populations. Hence, the 
EU’s policy in this area – even in cases that it is designed to support 
domestic civil society organizations – has frequently been regarded as 
external involvement in domestic affairs. Therefore, MPCs have been 
reluctant to really consider substantial policy changes. 
2.  The EU has failed to link the policies established within the three part-
nerships of the EMP. Although the different themes are covered by the 
three areas of co-operation, these areas are nonetheless interconnected if 
it comes to the goals the EMP is designed to attain.
5 However, the quite 
sophisticated development – even though also below initial expectations 
– in the economic realm could not be translated into progress in the 
sphere of good governance. The EU has – as in other areas – shown re-
luctance to follow a certain hard politics logic with rewards and sanc-
tions. Moreover, the Union itself has only recently begun to be more 
consequent in promoting the good governance agenda. Even though 
quite a number of regimes in MPCs are considered authoritarian, the EU 
has rather tolerated them than to insist on reforms because by introduc-
ing change it feared that this might weaken regimes and facilitate the 
rise of fundamentalism. The problem with this approach is that “authori-
 
5  Cf. Eric Philippart: The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership: Unique Features, First Re-
sults and Future Challenges (CEPS Middle East & Euro-Med Project Working Paper, 
10), Brussels 2003, p. 7. Andreas Marchetti 
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tarianism is a cause as well as a consequence of the democratic deficit”
6, 
classifying a good governance policy that is not concerned with these 
structures as very short-sighted. 
The four C’s to Strengthen the Union’s Good Govern-
ance Agenda – An Outlook 
The EU has constantly reviewed its Mediterranean policy and is doing so 
even more intensely in light of last year’s enlargement. Some strategic 
changes for the future have already been formulated and certain tendencies 
can already be identified, especially within the newly formulated European 
Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) that now serves as a framework for the Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership. These tendencies, along with the necessary ad-
justments that have not yet been translated into concrete policies, are based 
on four general principles, namely coherence, co-operation, conditionality, 
and communication.
7 
Coherence 
The European Neighbourhood Policy establishes a framework for the rela-
tions of the EU with countries in its vicinity in the East as well as in the 
South.
8 This implies a re-adjustment and the harmonization of existing 
partnership instruments, leading eventually to the replacement of quite dif-
ferent instruments, such as MEDA or FEMIP by the newly created Euro-
pean Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument.
9 This will ultimately lead 
 
6  Balfour, op. cit., p. 20. 
7  In an earlier article, I identified three general principles (coherence, co-operation, 
conditionality) to which a communicative component has been added here, cf. An-
dreas Marchetti: Barcelona, Neighbourhood and beyond. The EU’s long-term strate-
gies for democracy and security in the Wider Middle East (available at: 
http://www.uni-bonn.de/%7Euzswac/marchetti-barcelona_neighbourhood.pdf). 
8  For a brief summary of the basic documents and on the development of ENP’s geo-
graphic scope see Michele Comelli: The Challenges of the European Neighbourhood 
Policy, in: The International Spectator, 3/2004, pp. 98-101. 
9  Cf. Gonzalo Escribano: ¿Europeización sin Europa? Una reflexión crítica sobre la 
Política de Vecindad para el Mediterráneo (Real Instituto Elcano, Documento de 
Trabajo, 68), Madrid 2005, pp. 5f. Promoting Good Governance 
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to a more consistent policy, corresponding to the Union’s ambition to make 
its policies and its functioning more effective and transparent.
10 In the case 
of ENP, this is not only a question of increased inner-EU accountability but 
also of facilitating a clearer understanding of the EU’s external policy re-
gimes for outside actors. 
Apart from this general aspect of a sounder EU policy, the Union should 
also respect this principle of coherence in dealing with different partners. 
To ensure its general credibility, any kind of preference-policy vis-à-vis 
certain MPCs must be avoided because any special treatment – even if it is 
only perceived as such – would create frustration among other partners and 
undermine the EU’s overall objectives. This is particularly true for any 
double standards in human rights issues. 
Co-operation 
Within the EU’s Mediterranean policy, co-operation is already a key ele-
ment, yet it should be stressed even more in the sense that partners need to 
be taken more seriously, assuring them that the relations within the EMP 
framework – despite the fact that the EU is financing the process – are 
based on equal footing. This has always been at the basis of the principle of 
co-ordination in the functioning of the EMP.
11 However, The EU’s stance 
on democratic reforms and on pursuing the good governance agenda seems 
to have given some MPCs the impression that behind a co-operative rheto-
ric is hidden nothing less than a European will to impose EU concepts on 
the partners and that good governance might as well be translated into the 
less co-operative concept of regime change. This perception in MPCs has 
not facilitated the political dialogue. 
Bearing in mind the virtually unsuccessful EU policy in democracy-
building and in promoting good governance so far, the Union will eventu-
 
10 Cf. Erwan Lannon / Peter van Elsuwege: The EU’s Emerging Neighbourhood Policy 
and its Potential Impact on the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, in: Peter G. Xuereb 
(ed.): Euro-Med Integration and the ‘Ring of Friends’ (The Mediterranean’s Euro-
pean Challenge, 4), Malta 2003 (CD-edition), p. 59. 
11 Cf. Carlo Masala: Die Euro-Mediterrane Partnerschaft. Geschichte – Struktur – Pro-
zeß (ZEI, Discussion Paper, C 68), Bonn 2000, p. 17. Andreas Marchetti 
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ally have to focus less on democratization in general but rather on the good 
governance agenda,
12 which can be regarded as less sensible to MPCs, be-
cause introducing standards of good governance does not directly put rul-
ing elites’ positions within their countries at stake, making them maybe 
more willing to co-operate. 
The good governance agenda will have to continue to broadly focus on the 
guarantee of civil rights and the rule of law, the absolute prerequisites for 
any viable democracy. The guarantee of these rights and liberties might 
eventually lead to democracy but this must then be a domestic process that 
will be easier accepted than any externally prescribed concepts. The EU 
can and must be of assistance but the design of its policy has also to respect 
the fact that democracy in the Mediterranean – if it is to be viable – can 
only be built from within, a conviction that is also at the core of the latest 
Arab Human Development Report. Its analysis and recommendations are 
generally recognized as a kind of “blueprint” for a successful development 
in the region. The odds for a long-term process towards democracy along 
these lines are not too bad since a debate on democracy has already been 
successfully established within most countries concerned.
13 On the other 
hand, there is still a disconnect between the debates of an intellectual elite 
and the rest of the population. However, helping to create a supportive 
framework must be considered sufficient to initiate further change, because 
if the EU pushes the agenda too hard, the policy would be considered by 
MPCs as disregarding their autonomy and sovereignty, resulting in a sus-
pension of efforts. 
Conditionality 
The aspect of co-operation in the described sense does not, however, imply 
a decreasing commitment of EU policy. The contrary might well be the 
 
12 A tendency to do so can be seen in the Action Plans that are worked out with MPCs, 
cf. Michael Emerson / Gergana Noutcheva: From Barcelona Process to Neighbour-
hood Policy. Assessments and Open Issues (CEPS, Working Document, 220), Brus-
sels 2005, p. 18. 
13 This success is generally less attributed to the EMP than to the impact of the AHDR 
that is originating in the region and therefore regarded as highly objective and sensi-
tive with respect to the structure of societies concerned. Promoting Good Governance 
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case, especially if the failure to link the three partnerships under the roof of 
the EMP will be overcome. The basic but wrong assumption for doing so 
was the conviction that from increasing economic prosperity – the main 
concern of the economic and financial partnership – democracy would fi-
nally emerge. This is not to argue that there is no link between the two ar-
eas, but there is no explicit or even implicit automatism as is clearly 
illustrated by the Chinese model of modernisation without democratization. 
The hopes for political spill-over from economic development towards bet-
ter governance in MPCs have not been fulfilled. 
Thus, a strong consensus has emerged that the concept that needs to be-
come more relevant than presently is the idea of conditionality.
14 This con-
cept stresses that the EU needs to state clearly what it has to offer to 
partners and under which conditions it is willing to deliver. In practice, this 
would lead to a trade-off rather than to a spill-over. The trade-off would 
take place mostly between the economic sphere
15 and good governance is-
sues. The EU’s determination to introduce this kind of conditionality is al-
ready present in the Commission’s “Wider Europe” communication of 
March 2003.
16 The tendency for an increased willingness to use condition-
ality in relations with MPCs might also be seen in Art. I-57 of the Constitu-
tion for Europe. The article addresses the EU’s relations with its 
 
14 Cf. Emerson / Noutcheva, op. cit., p. 13; Comelli, op. cit., p. 105; Escribano, op. cit., 
p. 10. The Association Agreements under the EMP-regime have provisions for nega-
tive conditionality by threatening the (partial) suspension in case of non-compliance 
with basic political principles. However, the EU has not made use of these possibili-
ties so far. 
15 The ultimate incentive being access to the EU’s internal market, cf. European Com-
mission: Wider Europe – Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our 
Eastern and Southern Neighbours, COM(2003) 104 final, Brussels 2003, p. 10. 
(available at: http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/lex/LexUriServ/site/en/com/2003/com 
2003_0104en01.pdf). 
16 Cf. ibid., p. 16: “The extension of the benefits [...], including increased financial as-
sistance, should be conducted so as to encourage and reward reform – reforms which 
existing EU policies and incentives have so far not managed to elicit in all cases. En-
gagement should therefore be introduced progressively, and be conditional on 
meeting agreed targets for reform. New benefits should only be offered to reflect 
the progress made by the partner countries in political and economic reform. In the 
absence of progress, partners will not be offered these opportunities.“ (bold type in 
original). Andreas Marchetti 
  56   
neighbours and states explicitly that these relations will be “founded on the 
values of the Union”, stressing the increased importance given to the good 
governance agenda – and putting relations with partners on a very high 
level by including them explicitly in the EU’s constitutional document. By 
introducing conditionality in relations with MPCs, the Union’s as well as 
partners’ positions would be clearer because underlying objectives became 
more apparent and progress more measurable. 
Communication 
Whereas in the past “Europeans have opted for short-term stability and a 
preservation of the status quo”
17 and thereby accepting that progress in 
governance remained more or less insignificant, the EU seems increasingly 
determined to re-base its policy on the positive correlation seen between 
good governance and stability. However, after rejecting a policy that is 
willing to trade off democracy for – fragile and presumably only short-term 
– stability and security, the EU has to communicate this link also to MPCs. 
To accomplish this, the EU will have to focus more on the explicit interests 
of partners and address not only its own external security, but also the in-
ternal security in MPCs. This is especially true for convincing the popula-
tions – from a European perspective good governance/democracy are 
regarded as values in themselves, consequently, a policy towards their 
promotion is normally not considered to need any further motivation. How-
ever, this might not be sufficient in the region. Therefore, the EU has to 
point out the individual benefits of good governance, like for example the 
guarantee of basic civil liberties, the abolishment of random arrests or other 
repressive measures, a decrease in corruption for access to public services, 
in short, the promotion of increased individual liberty and security espe-
cially vis-à-vis national executives. If these are the issues that are commu-
nicated and put on the agenda, people will be much more encouraged to 
support change and reform than if the only motivation offered were some 
abstract concept under the label of good governance/democracy. 
 
17 Mona Yacoubian: Promoting Middle East Democracy. European Initiatives (USIP, 
Special Report, 127), Washington 2004, p. 8. Promoting Good Governance 
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To properly communicate the prospective benefits of reforming along the 
lines of the good governance agenda is crucial for any progress in the field. 
However, it has to be borne in mind that results are not necessarily positive 
at all times due to what could be called the security-democratization-
dilemma (Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1: The security-democratization-dilemma (schematic). 
 
 
Clear democracy-building or – to a lesser extend – policies towards good 
governance imply introducing elements of change into the respective coun-
tries. Change, however, might – at least in the mid-term – also lead to a 
certain degree of instability and therefore an increase of security-threats.
18 
Nonetheless, democracy is considered a central factor for internal and ex-
ternal security, and a well-accompanied process of change, leading to the 
guarantee of civil liberties and favouring economic growth and investment, 
is conceived to lead to a more stable and secure environment in the long-
run. Yet in case of change the period of potential instability cannot be 
avoided. 
 
 
18 Cf. also the statement of Jochen Hippler in: Wanda Vrasti: Conference Report. SEF-
Berlin Summer Dialogue 2005. Security Through Democracy-Building in the Middle 
East. A promising strategy or merely Western propaganda? 17-18 June 2005, Bonn 
2005, p. 18. 
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Why, then, should the EU and its partners engage in such a process now? 
The reason why they need to do so is that the alternative – opting for stabil-
ity by avoiding change – would be worse in the long-run, for the EU as 
well as for Mediterranean partners. The perspective of leaving the state of 
Mediterranean societies as it is, might result in some kind of short-term 
stability but would eventually lead to the – maybe forceful – dissolution of 
present systems. This would finally result in less stability and security than 
today, an outcome that cannot be in neither side’s interest. Therefore, de-
spite all uncertainties, it must clearly be in the interest of the EU and its 
Mediterranean partners to initiate a process of subsequent political change 
in order to canalize any systemically destructive tendencies. Consequently, 
introducing change in the region is the only way to eventually generate a 
win-win-situation for both sides of the Mediterranean – a message that 
needs to be stressed also with reference to the concept of “common owner-
ship” of the Barcelona Process in order to hold MPCs increasingly respon-
sible as well. 
Conclusion 
Good governance – in terms of concrete policies – has been a somewhat 
neglected area in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership so far. This is not 
because of a general unimportance associated with the issue but because of 
the fact that results in the area have been far below expectations, resulting 
in a certain frustration on behalf of the actors. Nonetheless, the conviction 
is breaking ground that the issue of good governance is one of the most 
crucial issues for a development in peace and prosperity of the region that 
will only be implemented successfully by adopting a long-term perspective. 
Any short-term actionism will in the best case change not much because it 
is not able to substantially transform societies from within. The consequent 
implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy along the basic 
lines discussed – coherence, co-operation, conditionality, and communica-
tion – will facilitate such a long-term process of change significantly – for 
the benefit of Europe and of Mediterranean partners. Jan J. Michalek 
Economics in the Mediterranean 
Common Challenges 
The tenth anniversary of the Barcelona Declaration (1995), which formally 
initiated the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, is a good occasion to assess 
the economic achievements of Mediterranean Partner Countries (MPC)
1. In 
this paper I will describe only some selected aspects of the second pillar of 
the Barcelona Process, devoted to the “economic and financial partner-
ship”.
2 In the second pillar the declaration talks about the area of shared 
prosperity with a focus on improving living conditions, accelerating the 
pace of socio-economic development and reducing the development gap. 
The performance of MPC will be evaluated in relative terms against the 
economic position of new EU member states (NMS) from Central and 
Eastern Europe. The latter countries faced similar challenges during the last 
decade. 
 
1  The following MED countries are participating in the Euro-Mediterranean Partner-
ship: Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia and West 
Bank and Gaza. (West Bank and Gaza have the status of a "territory"). 
2  The number of publications evaluating the 10 years period of Barcelona Process is 
already quite large. Many detailed studies were made under auspices of FEMISE 
network (see bibliography for details). Jan J. Michalek 
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Shared prosperity: real convergence? 
The simplest indicator measuring the real income convergence is GDP 
(Gross domestic Product) per capita, expressed in PPP terms
3. The average 
GDP of MPC increased in comparison to the EU countries, but the popula-
tion growth was also higher there. Therefore, despite progress made, the 
average income of Mediterranean countries declined slightly to 18.1 per 
cent of the average income in EU member states.
4 Real convergence was 
observed only in Morocco, while in other countries there were no changes 
(Algeria, Egypt) or a relative decline. The relevant data are presented in 
Chart 1.  
 
Chart 1: Convergence in income level of MPC countries 1994-2004 (GDP per capita in 
PPP relative to the EU) 
 
Source: European Commission (2005), p. 3. 
 
Also, the new EU member states face the challenge of real convergence 
with old EU members, but their situation is slightly different. Their level of 
GDP is about half that of the EU average, but it is about three times higher 
 
3  PPP: Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) measures income in terms of purchasing power, 
which is a better measure of real relative income than the GDP expressed at current 
exchange rates (prices in developed countries are usually higher). 
4  The special position of Israel should be noticed here. The level of GDP per capita in 
the country was very close to EU average, and well above average of NMS. But, dur-
ing the analyzed period it has declined, in relative terms (see: Chart 1). Economics in the Mediterranean 
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than in MPC countries.  The relevant data for period 1995-2002 is pre-
sented in Table 1. 
 
Table 1: GDP per capita (PPP) of selected countries in current US dollars  
Country/Year 1995  2000  2002 
Algeria  4 620  5 430  5 760 
Egypt  2 780  3 550  3 810 
Israel  17 040  20 600  19 530 
Jordan  3 730  3 920  4 220 
Lebanon  3 780  4 210  4 360 
Morocco  2 960  3 480  3 810 
Syria  2 910  3 340  3 620 
Tunisia  4 680  6 270  6 760 
Turkey  5 140  6 250  6 390 
Estonia  6 780  10 280  12 260 
Hungary  9 180  12 320  13 400 
Latria  5 090  7 610  9 210 
Lithuania  6 190  8 720  10 320 
Poland  7 160  9 940  10 560 
Czech Rep.  11 720  14 000  15 780 
Slovakia  8 620  11 450  12 840 
Slovenia  12 190  16 610  18 540 
Romania  5 610  5 720  6 560 
MPC* (median)  3 730  3 920  4 220  
NMS10 (median)  8 900  11 885  12 840  
EU15 (median)  21 000  25 320  26 920  
EU25  (median)  15 540  19 960  23 755  
Source: ILO and Word Bank, Quoted from FEMISE 2005, Annex table 1a. 
The data in Table 1 and Figure 1 are not directly comparable because the period of 
comparison and measures (average versus median) are different. Jan J. Michalek 
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It should also be noted that during the period of 1995-2003 NMS outper-
formed (in terms of GDP growth) the MPCs and therefore the real conver-
gence of NMS’ incomes has been perceptible. Basing on data presented in 
Table 1, the average income of NMS constituted (in 2002) 47,5 per cent of 
EU 15 and was 42,3% in 1995. So the difference in real income decreased 
by about five percentage points.  
The analysis of other statistical data measuring economic and social pro-
gress reveals the similar phenomenon. Despite some progress noticed in 
MPCs in health indicators, the Mediterranean countries are still lagging 
behind developed EU members in terms of under-five mortality rate, ma-
ternal mortality ratio, and incidence of tuberculosis. Also, in terms of edu-
cation levels and gender equality, all MPCs, with the exception of Israel, 
have indicators well below EU member states.
5 
What were therefore the causes of relatively poorer performance of MPCs 
and relatively better performance of East European countries, being new 
members of the EU? It seems that all groups of middle-income countries 
(with no exception of transition East European countries), aiming at accel-
erating economic growth, had to undergo gradual reforms improving the 
efficiency of their economies. These reforms usually consisted of: 
1.  macroeconomic stabilization (low rate of inflation, fiscal consolidation, 
and external equilibrium); 
2.  liberalization of trade in goods, services and capital flows; 
3.  reforms of government and local institutions; 
4.  creating conditions for accelerated economic growth (high rate of capi-
tal formation, stable equilibrium and resistance to internal and external 
shocks). 
Of course, the sequence of reforms is not always the same. In many cases 
there was a successful combination of institutional reforms and external 
liberalization. It seems that NMS and many MPC attempted to follow the 
gradual reforms mentioned above. But the degree of commitment in pursu-
ing these policies was somewhat different.  Economics in the Mediterranean 
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Macroeconomic stabilization 
The progress in macroeconomic stabilization of MPC and NMS was visi-
ble. All Mediterranean countries were especially successful in avoiding 
monetary expansion and reducing rates of inflation. The relevant data is 
shown in Chart 2. Now, all MPC have a reasonably low rate of inflation 
(below 4 per cent). 
 
Chart 2: The decline of inflation rates in Mediterranean countries (1994-2004) 
 
Source: European Commission (2005), p. 10. 
 
The success in fiscal consolidation of MPC was much less obvious. Some 
countries made some progress which was undermined during the years 
2002-2003, when the average fiscal budget deficit rose to about 4,4 per 
cent of GDP. The data is shown in Table 2.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
5  European Commission (2005), p. 7-9. Jan J. Michalek 
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Table 2: General government fiscal balances, excluding grants (% of GDP) 
Country 
Lear 
MPC  Alge-
ria 
Egypt Israel Jor-
dan 
Leba-
non 
Moro
-cco 
Syria   Tuni-
sia 
1997  ---  2,3  --- --- -7,3  -27,4  --- --- -4,4 
1998  ---  -3,8  --- --- -9,7  -18,3  --- --- -3,0 
1999  ---  -2,0 -0,6 -5,1 -7,0 -16,2  -4,5 ---  -3,9 
2000  -2,3  9,7  -1,8 -3,2 -8,9 -24,6  -6,4 -1,5 -3,9 
2001  -4,0  3,0  -2,7 -6,5 -8,0 -18,9  -5,8 2,5  -3,8 
2002  -4,5  0,2  -3,5 -6,3 -10,1  -15,1  -4,5 -1,6 -3,5 
2003  -4,3  5,0  -3,3 -8,1 -13,0  -14,6  -5,5 -1,6 -3,5 
2004 est  -3,3  5,2  ---  -6,1 -13,4  -8,2 -5,9 -2,7 -2,8 
Source: European Commission (2005). P. 12. 
 
In fact, in 2004 only Algeria had fiscal surplus due to high prices of crude 
oil. Fiscal performance of Jordan, Egypt and Israel has weakened in the 
early years of the 21
st century. The reduction in revenues resulted from re-
ceding customs duties (resulting from trade liberalization) and the slow 
pace of the privatization process. 
On the other hand, the MPC made significant progress in curbing down 
external disequilibria. In 2004, a majority of them, with exception of Leba-
non, the West Bank and Gaza, despite big volatility, had current accounts 
in equilibrium (see Chart 3). A large chronic deficit existed in Lebanon 
only, while large variations were observable in Egypt and Algeria.  
 
Chart 3: MPC external account balances in 2004 (est. in % of GDP) 
 
Source: European Commission (2005), p.12.  Economics in the Mediterranean 
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In conclusion, the MPC managed to make significant progress in macro-
economic stabilization, with the exception of fiscal consolidation. The posi-
tion of new members states from Eastern Europe during 1990s has been 
somewhat better. All of them restricted very significantly monetary expan-
sion and reduced inflation rates. A majority of them faced substantial cur-
rent account deficits, but they managed to finance them by capital inflows 
(mainly through FDI)
6 and partially by direct transfers from the EU budget. 
Substantial progress was made in fiscal consolidation as well. Only some 
of them - recently Poland - had fiscal deficits exceeding 3% of GDP, i.e. 
above the threshold set within the convergence criteria for future Euroland 
members. Until 2001 all other NMS, despite some temporary slippages, 
have managed to maintain the deficit within the 3% threshold (see Table 3). 
 
Table 3: Overall budget balance (% of GDP) 
Country    1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Czech  Rep.  0,3 0,1 -1,1  -1,6 -1,6 -3,0 -1,9 
Estonia  -0,6 -0,8 2,5  -0,1 -0,2 0,2  2,5 
Latvia  -3,5 -1,7 0,8  0,2  -3,8 -2,7 -1,4 
Lithuania  -4,6 -3,6 -1,9 -0,4 -7,1 -1,3 -0,4 
Poland  -1,9 -2,0 -1,8 -1,0 -0,8 0,3  -4,3 
Slovenia  -0,1 0,0  -1,4 -0,8 -0,7 -1,2 -1,0 
Slovak Republic  ..  -1,4  -4,0 -3,7 -3,2 -3,0 -3,2 
Source: Word Development Indicators 2004 
Towards globalization: trade opening of economies 
The second important element of efficiency promoting reforms is usually 
seen in the opening up of the economy. Liberalization of imports, espe-
cially reduction of tariffs and elimination of quantitative restrictions, is fre-
quently treated as a core element of reforms promoting trade and improving 
economic efficiency. All MPC countries made progress in trade liberaliza-
tion (see Chart 4) but the pace of liberalization was differentiated among 
those countries.  
 
 
6  See the next section on FDI. Jan J. Michalek 
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Chart 4. Reduction of import duties in MPC. Comparison of simple average MFN duties 
in 1995 and the most recent available year. 
 
Source: FEMISE (2005), p. 19 
 
Initially, the levels of protection were different, but five countries were 
considered to have high rates of customs duties (namely: Morocco, Tunisia, 
Egypt, Algeria and Jordan). During the Barcelona Process, Morocco has 
reduced its tariffs by around 37%, Algeria, Tunisia and Egypt chose a 
slower dismantling: during the same ten years their tariffs have fallen by 
about 6 percentage points (for Algeria and Tunisia) and 8 points (for 
Egypt). Jordan, on the other hand, has reduced its duties only recently; by 
over 9 percentage points between 2000 and 2003, meaning a fall of 43% in 
three years. Yet, the overall level of tariff protection in MPC is still quite 
high by European standards. The comparison between MPC and NMS tar-
iff profiles in 2003 is shown in Table 4. 
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Table 4: MFN applied tariff profiles (simple average in 2003, or previous available 
year) 
Coun-
try: 
  
Simple average  Country: 
  
simple average 
      All  Agric. 
Non-
agric.        All  Agric. 
Non-
agric. 
Algeria     18,7  23,4  18,0  Czech Rep.  4,9  10,0  4,1 
Egypt     19,9  22,8  19,4  Estonia     1,7  12,2  0,1 
Israel     5,6  15,9  4,0  Hungary     9,5  26,2  7,0 
Jordan     13,1  19,8  12,1  Latvia     3,5  11,8  2,2 
Lebanon     5,4  14,7  4,0  Lithuania     3,3  9,7  2,4 
Morocco     30,3  48,6  27,5  Poland     13,4  39,8  10,1 
Syria     19,6  21,3  19,4  Slovenia     9,6  11,3  9,3 
Tunisia     28,6  70,4  22,1  Slovakia  5,0  10,0  4,3 
Turkey     10,0  42,9 5,0  Average NMS  6,4 16,4  4,9 
average MPC  16,8 31,1  14,6  Average EU   4,2 5,9 4,0 
Source: World Trade Report 2004, WTO, Appendix, table 2. 
 
It is quite obvious that the scope of liberalization among NMS before ac-
cession was much larger. Average NMS’ tariffs were 2.5 times lower and 
not very different from the common external tariff (CET) of the EU. The 
differences between NMS tariffs and CET were more pronounced in the 
agricultural products. Among NMS only Poland had visibly higher duties; 
the level of which was comparable to MPC. Now, of course, all NMS apply 
to imports from third countries the same common external tariff. 
Trade liberalization is usually treated only as a means towards the opening 
up of the economy, which should increase the competitive pressure on the 
market and the competitiveness of local producers. One of the simplest 
measures is the ratio of exports and imports to the GDP of a given country. 
Here, MPC noted some rather limited progress. Since the time of Barcelona 
Declaration this ratio increased slightly in Jordan, Morocco and Turkey, 
while in other countries there were no major changes. The relevant data is 
presented in Chart 6. On the other hand, the NMS, which liberalized sig-
nificantly their tariffs, witnessed a quite drastic increase of the same ratio 
(Estonia, Slovakia, Czech Rep. and Hungary). Also, the average absolute 
level of openness was significantly higher in NMS in comparison with Jan J. Michalek 
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MPC. The relevant data is presented in Table 4, which shows the share of 
exports and imports in the GDP of analyzed countries. 
 
Chart 5: Levels of MPC and NMS openness (exports + imports as a percentage of GDP) 
 
Source: FEMISE (2003), p. 27. 
 
In 2002, the average share of exports to GDP in NMS (59%) was almost 
double comparing to MPC (33%). The same discrepancy was observed in 
the share of imports (64% to 38%). Of course, one should note that the de-
gree of openness is usually inversely correlated with the size of he country. 
So, it is quite normal that larger countries, in terms of population and area - 
like Egypt, Turkey or Poland - are much less open in comparison to quite 
small countries like Estonia, Slovenia or Slovakia. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Economics in the Mediterranean 
  69
Table 5: Measure of openness: Exports and imports of goods and services as a percent-
age of GDP (simple averages) 
  Year  1992 1995 1997 2000 2001 2002   1992 1995 1997 2000 2001 2002 
Country 
Exports of goods and services (as a % 
of GDP)    
Imports of goods and services (as a % 
of GDP)  
Algeria  25 27 31 42 36 36   24 31 22 21 22 26 
Egypt  29 22 19 16 17 16   32 28 26 23 22 23 
Israel  31 31 31 40 35 37   44 45 41 45 43 46 
Jordan  50 52 49 42 43 46   82 73 72 68 68 67 
Lebanon  11 12 10 13 14 14   76 65 50 38 44 41 
Morocco  25 27 28 31 33 32   32 34 32 38 36 37 
Syria  26 31 32 38 39 37   38 38 34 30 31 28 
Tunisia  40 45 44 44 47 45   46 49 46 48 52 49 
Turkey  14 20 25 24 34 30   17 24 30 32 31 30 
Av. MPC  28 30 30 32 33 33   43 43 39 38 39 38 
Czech  Rep. 54 54 57 70 71 65   54 58 62 73 73 67 
Estonia  60 72 78 94 89 84   54 80 90 98 93 94 
Hungary  31 44 55 75 74 64   32 44 54 79 76 67 
Latvia  80 47 51 46 44 45   73 50 60 54 56 56 
Lithuania  23 52 54 46 51 54   20 63 65 52 56 60 
Poland  24 25 25 28 28 28   22 23 30 35 32 31 
Slovakia  70 57 56 72 74 73   74 56 66 74 82 80 
Slovenia  63 55 57 57 58 58   56 57 58 60 59 56 
Average 
NMS  51 51 54 61 61 59   48 54 61 66 66 64 
Source: World Development Indicators 2004.  
 
Finally, there are some differences in trade orientation, reflecting export 
and import dependencies of analyzed countries on the European Union 
market (see Table 6). Generally speaking, MPC are less closely related to 
the EU market. The share of EU market in the exports of MPC is close to 
50%, being much lower in the case of Jordan, Israel and Lebanon. In the 
case of NMS, the average share is close to 62% and only in the case of 
Lithuania this share is below 50%. This means that East European coun-
tries have more incentives to adapt their products to the requirements of the 
EU market. This is especially important when the EU’s technical regula-
tions and standards are fairly specific and/or restrictive. Also, on the import 
side the NMS are more dependent (56% is the share of the EU) in compari-
son to MPC. Jan J. Michalek 
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The crucial question is to which extent this pattern of trade reflects trade 
facilitations provided by “Europe Agreements” with NMS and preferences 
accorded to MPC. It is impossible to answer this question without a quanti-
tative (econometric) analysis. But it seems that other factors, and especially 
shorter distance and elimination of technical barriers to trade, do play an 
important role
7.   
 
Table 6: Trade orientation: share (in %) of exports and imports towards/from the EU 
Mediterranean Partners 
– Exports 
Imports NMS - Exports  Imports
   1990 1995 2001 2001      1995 2001 2001 
Algeria 59 65 65 46  Estonia  55 60 52 
Egypt  59 55 57 38  Hungary  63 74 58 
Israel  29 32 27 42  Latvia  44 61 55 
Jordan  3 6 4 28  Lithuania  40  43  48 
Lebanon  38 24 19 45  Poland  69 69 61 
Morocco  68 62 74 57  Slovakia  38 60 50 
Syria  50 70 68 43  Slovenia  67 62 68 
Tunisia 63 79 80 71  Czech  Rep. 61 69 62 
Turkey  30  51  51  44             
Average  44,3 49,3 49,4 46,0      54,6 62,3 56,8 
Source: FEMISE (2003), p. 28. 
 
One should also take into consideration the specificity of the agricultural 
sector in MPC and its impact on trade. In fact agriculture is vital for MPC; 
in most Mediterranean countries it represents 10 to 20% of GDP (as com-
pared to 3% in Europe) and accounts, on average, for more than 20% of 
employment, as compared to 4.3% in Europe. Agriculture in MPC offers 
significant opportunities, but at the same time it is subject to major con-
straints. Opportunities are given through important comparative advantages 
in fruits, vegetables and fishing, activities where production and exporta-
tion reserves exist. Here, the level of support of CAP is much lower com-
pared to continental production. Moreover, the production of fruits and 
 
7  There are many empirical studies, based mainly on gravity models, showing the sig-
nificance of distance for trade flows. See also some empirical studies (WTO, 2004, p. 
114-128) On the other hand, some other studies (eg. Brenton, Manzocchi (2001) or 
Moenius (1999)) reveal that standards might influence trade flows and patterns. Economics in the Mediterranean 
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vegetables that represented an average of 16% of the agricultural produc-
tion in the EU during these past years, only received 4.5% from EAGGF-
Guarantee Section. There are no direct payments made by hectare. The 
most important products in which MPC demonstrated strong comparative 
advantages are: edible nuts, fresh fruits, mollusks, olive oil, fruit nuts, or-
anges, prepared vegetables, grapes, cotton, cut flowers, prepared and fresh 
fish, potatoes and tomatoes
8. These products face competition at the EU 
market from some southern regions of EU countries (Italy, France, Greece, 
Spain) and from some NMS (red fruits and potatoes). The major exporters 
are Turkey, Israel, Tunisia and Morocco.  
Constraints result mainly from a relatively high level of CET and residual 
quantitative restrictions (temporary tariff quotas) in this sector. Even if 
quotas appear not to be very restrictive, they, in fact, might limit signifi-
cantly the volume of trade. The elimination of trade barriers in agriculture, 
after the accession in 2004, increased significantly exports of NMS, al-
though it is still premature to quantify precisely the scope of this effect. 
Towards globalization: increased Foreign Direct          
Investments (FDI) 
The importance of FDI for an economic performance of a host country is 
now broadly recognized both by theoretical analysis and empirical studies.
9 
Economic reforms pursued by MPC and NMS and macroeconomic stability 
aimed, inter alia,  at attracting foreign investors in both neighboring re-
gions. The success of MPC is quite important. Since the Barcelona Decla-
ration the total annual inflows increased from 3.5 USD billions to 12 
billions in 2001, and decreased afterwards to 9 billions in 2003. In absolute 
terms, the most successful countries from the region were Israel (25 bil-
lions), Turkey and Morocco (10 billions each). Recently, also Algeria at-
tracted important amounts of FDI, mainly due to high prices of crude oil. 
 
8  FEMISE (2004 d), p. 12. 
9  See e.g. Markusem (2002) for theory and UNCTAD (2004) for empirical studies.  Jan J. Michalek 
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The relevant data demonstrating the FDI inflows for MPC is presented in 
Table 7.  
 
Table 7: Net foreign investment (FDI) inflows to MPC, USD millions. 
   Algeria  Egypt  Israel  Jordan  Lebanon Morocco  Syria Tunisia  Turkey  MPC  (total) 
1990     734  101  38     165  71  76  684  1 869 
1991 12 253  350  -12      317  62  125  810  1 917 
1992 10 459  539  41     423  67  526  844  2 909 
1993  -59 493 429 -34     491 176  562  636  2 694 
1994  18  1 256  432  3     551  251  566  608  3 685 
1995  5  596  1 337  13     335  100  378  885  3 649 
1996  4  637  1 382  16     357  89  351  722  3 558 
1997  7  888  1 622  361     1 079  80  366  805  5 208 
1998  501 1  076  1  887  310 200 417 82  668  940  6 081 
1999  507 1  065  3  111  158 250 850 263  368  783  7 355 
2000  438 1  235  5  011  787 298 215 270  779  982  10 015 
2001  1 196  510  3 549  100  249  2 825  110  486  3 266  12 291 
2002  1 065  647  1 721  56  257  481  115  821  1 038  6 201 
2003  634 237 3  745  379 358 2  279  150  584  575  8 941 
sum of the 
above  4 338  10 086  25 216  2 216  1 612  10 785  1 886  6 656  13 578  76 373 
Source: UNCTAD,   World Investment Reports 1995 to 2004; Quoted after FMISE 
(2005) Annex, table 3a 
 
The reforms in the NMS were even deeper and broader. As a result, also 
NMS, labeled some time as emerging economies, managed to attract FDI, 
coming mainly from the EU and the United States. The relevant data is pre-
sented in Table 8. 
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Table 8: Net foreign investment (FDI) inflows to NMS, USD millions. 
Year Czech  Estonia  Hungary  Latvia  Lithuania Poland Romania Slovakia  Slovenia NMS** 
1990  72 0  311 0  0  89 0  93  4  569 
1991  523 0  1  462  0  0  291 40  81  65  2 462 
1992  1 003  82  1 479  29  10  678  77  100  111  3 569 
1993  654 162 2  350  45  30  1  715  94  179  113  5 342 
1994  878 215 1  144  214 31  1  875  341  273  116  5 088 
1995  2 568  202  5 103  180  73  3 659  419  258  152  12 613 
1996  1 435  150  3 300  382  152  4 498  263  370  174  10 724 
1997  1 286  267  4 167  521  355  4 908  1 215  231  332  13 281 
1998  3 700  581  3 828  357  926  6 365  2 031  707  218  18 711 
1999  6 310  305  3 312  347  486  7 270  1 041  428  106  19 605 
2000  4 984  387  2 764  411  379  9 341  1 037  1 925  137  21 366 
2001  5 639  542  3 936  163  446  5 713  1 157  1 584  369  19 550 
2002  8 483  284  2 845  384  732  4 131  1 144  4 123  1 606  23 732 
2003  2 583  891  2 470  360  179  4 225  1 566  571  181  13 025 
sum of the 
above  40 118  4 068  38 471  3 393  3 799  54 758 10 425  10 923  3 684 
169 
637 
Source: UNCTAD,   World Investment Reports 1995 to 2004; Quoted after 
FMISE (2005) Annex, table 3a 
 
In absolute terms, the most successful countries from the region were Po-
land, Czech Rep. and Hungary. But in relative (per capita) terms, the suc-
cess of small countries like Estonia, Slovenia and Slovakia is much more 
important.  
The positive impact of FDI on the growth of the host economy is twofold. 
On the one hand it can increase the rate of capital formation and thus the 
rate of growth. On the other, it can - mainly via backward and forward 
linkages with domestic companies - accelerate the rate of technical pro-
gress being implemented in the  host economy. But it is quite difficult to 
evaluate the scope of the second effect, while the first one is simpler to 
measure. Namely it can be asked what share of gross fixed capital forma-
tion is made via FDI? This type of data is presented in the subsequent 
charts. 
 
 
 Jan J. Michalek 
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Chart 6: FDI as a percentage of Gross Fixed Capital Formation (GFCF) in MPC and 
NMS. 
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Source: World Development Indicators 2004.  
 
The differences between the two regions are visible. From 1995 to 2002 the 
NMS financed almost 20 per cent of their GFCF through FDI, while in 
MPC this amounted to about 11 per cent. In 2003, it declined significantly 
in NMS. The most successful countries in the Mediterranean region were 
Israel and Tunisia, but also Jordan and Morocco in an irregular manner. In 
the East European region the best performing countries were Slovakia, 
Czech Republic, Estonia and Hungary.  
The positive impact of FDI should be transmitted into higher growth 
through a higher rate of investment. The latter in turn can be measured by a 
ratio of GFCF to GDP. The relevant data is presented in Table 9. The MPC 
performed quite well, and especially countries like Tunisia, Jordan, Algeria 
and Israel. The differences between the regions are not striking, but NMS 
managed to increase slightly the ratio from 22.5% to 24.4% in the period 
from 1995 to 2002, while in MPCs the ratio of GFCF to GDP decreased 
visibly from 25 to 20.7 percent. Economics in the Mediterranean 
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Table 9:  Gross fixed capital formation (as % of GDP)  
Country  1992 1995 1997 2000 2001 2002 
Algeria  27,1 29,1 24,7 22,5 22,7 24,7 
Egipt  19,1 16,2 18,5 17,7 16,4 16,5 
Izrael  23,5 25,3 23,6 19,8 18,8 17,8 
Jordan  29,0 29,6 25,8 21,0 21,2 21,7 
Lebanon  25,0 35,8 26,3 18,1 16,7 18,0 
Morocco  22,4 21,4 20,7 24,1 22,3 22,9 
Syria  23,2 27,2 21,1 19,0 21,3 21,7 
Tunisia  32,3 24,2 24,7 26,3 26,2 25,2 
Turkey  23,6 23,8 26,4 22,4 18,2 17,7 
Average MPC  25,0 25,9 23,5 21,2 20,4 20,7 
Czech Rep.  27,8  32,0 30,6 28,3 27,7 26,3 
Estonia  21,0 25,9 28,0 25,4 26,5 28,5 
Hangary  19,9 20,0 22,2 24,1 23,6 22,3 
Latria  11,2 15,2 18,8 26,5 27,0 25,7 
Lithuania  23,0 22,0 23,5 19,2 20,6 21,3 
Poland  16,8 18,6 23,5 23,9 20,9 18,6 
Slovakia  32,9 25,2 34,3 29,5 31,3 29,8 
Slovenia  18,4 21,4 23,4 25,7 24,0 22,6 
Average NMS  21,4 22,5 25,5 25,3 25,2 24,4 
Source: World Development Indicators 2004.  
 
So, in summing up this section it is possible to state that the NMS in gen-
eral outperformed MPC in terms of opening up their economies and attract-
ing FDI, coming mainly from EU countries. Did it happen by accident or 
was it a result of internal reforms and changes occurring in those countries? 
Internal reforms of government and local institutions 
Measuring changes and efficiency of domestic institutions is not an easy 
task, which became quite fashionable recently. There are already many in-
dicators aiming at estimating this phenomenon. But they are constructed in 
a different way, take into account various partial indicators and are there-
fore not directly comparable. Still, all of them give a general picture of the 
status quo and the direction of changes. Some of these indicators for MPC 
are quoted in Table 10. 
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Table 10: Indices measuring reform progress in MPC. 
         Year 
 
Countries 
Fraser Institute
1 
Econ. Freedom Index
Heritage Foundation
2 
Econ. Freedom Index 
World Bank
3 
Governance index 
 1995  2002  1995  2002  1995  2002 
Algeria 3,82  4,56  3,68  3,31  -0,97  -0,81 
Egypt 5,80  6,19  3,69  3,28  -0,19  -0,37 
Israel 5,71  6,63  2,90  2,36  0,87  0,56 
Jordan 6,06    7,03  2,90 3,73  0,07  -0,01 
Lebanon ---  ---  2,96  3,13 -0,20  -0,44 
Morocco   5,90  5,90  3,03  2,93  -0,12  -0,05 
Syria 4,39  5,36  4,15  3,88  -0,72  -0,66 
Tunisia 5,95  6,31  2,98  2,94  0,03  0,11 
W.B. & Gaza  ---   ---  ---  ---  0,07  -1,02 
Israel 5,71  6,63  2,90  2,36  0,87  0,56 
Maghreb
4 5,22  5,59  3,23  3,06  -0,35 -0,25 
Mashrek
4 5,42  6,19  3,30  3,26  -0,20 -0,50 
MPCs
4 5,38  6,00  3,20  3,07  -0,13  -0,30 
1.  The Fraser index runs from 1 to 10. Higher values reflect institutions and policies conducive to free-
dom for economic activities. 
2.  The Heritage index runs from 1 to 5. A score of 1 indicates an institutional framework and a set of 
policies that are most conducive to economic freedom while a score of 5 indicates signifies a set of 
policies that are least conducive. 
3.  The World Bank scales run from -2.5 to +2.5, whereby higher values reflect better policies. 
4.  Arithmetic (simple) average. 
Source: quoted from European Commission 2005, p. 16. 
 
Unfortunately, the different indices quoted here do not allow to make clear-
cut conclusions. According to the Fraser Institute’s index the MPC made 
some progress in implementing reforms between 1995 and 2002 and 
reached a level similar to NMS. The biggest improvement could be ob-
served in Jordan and Israel, while the state of reforms in Syria and Algeria 
is still modest.  
According to the Heritage Foundation, despite some progress, most MPC 
still belong to the category "mostly un-free countries". Some improvement 
was observed in Israel, Egypt and Algeria, while slight regress was noted in 
Tunisia and Lebanon in the analyzed period. The index shows that the re-
form efforts of MPC were less advanced in comparison with NMS.  Fi-
nally, the index developed by the World Bank reveals a deterioration in Economics in the Mediterranean 
  77
reforms of MPC. Only Morocco and Tunisia noted minor improvement. 
According to the WB analysis the regulatory burden constrains private sec-
tor development and economic activity appears to be affected by excessive 
regulation, market-unfriendly policies and corruption. 
All indices reveal that freedom of economic activity in MPC is still con-
strained by high fiscal burdens, strong government intervention in trade, 
high regulatory burdens and a relatively weak legal framework. Further-
more, substantial public ownership of enterprises and large public con-
sumption distorts private sector activity.
10  
The quality of domestic institutions (including the level of bureaucracy, 
law enforcement, transparency and corruption) is one of the key elements 
influencing the quality of the business climate. Other elements are access to 
finance, tax regime, quality of human capital and infrastructure. It is not 
surprising that the quality of business climate usually has significant impact 
on GDP growth, domestic investment and FDI. The average GDP growth 
rates for 1990-1999 were positively correlated with the GCI ranking across 
countries
11. The relevant data presenting the assessment of business climate 
in the EU and MPC is presented below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
10 As a consequence of unfriendly environment, black market and informal activities 
are prevalent among MPC, (with the overall size of the informal sector estimated to 
vary between 30% and 70% of GDP). Euroepan Commission (2005). 
11 European Commission (2005), p.56. Jan J. Michalek 
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Chart 7: Assessment of the business climate (GCI 2004 scores) 
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Note: The WEF growth competitiveness index ranges from 1 (worst) to 7 (best). 
European Commission (2005), p. 55. 
 
The indices of business climate in MPC are visibly lower than those of 
NMS, but Mediterranean countries made some progress in the 1990s. The 
quality of human capital has improved and the institutions have become 
more efficient and less bureaucratic. Still, the major goals should include 
increasing public sector transparency and efficiency, reducing corruption 
and creating an environment where SMEs and innovations receive the fi-
nancial support they need. The economic performance and especially the 
ability to attract FDI, is higher among countries having a better business 
climate (among them Israel, Morocco and Tunisia) than in the case of other 
MPC. The overall macroeconomic performance and other indices reflecting 
opening up of MPC economies have already been described. 
Concluding remarks 
The economic performance of MPC has been quite good since the Barce-
lona Declaration. Almost all countries managed to reach macroeconomic 
stabilization. The inflation rates have been curbed down, the fiscal consoli-
dation improved and the external equilibrium was stable. But, there was no 
progress in real convergence, as measured in GDP per capita.  Economics in the Mediterranean 
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The Mediterranean countries partially succeeded in opening their econo-
mies, as well. The level of import duties has slightly decreased, although 
the share of imports in the GDP remained almost constant over the ana-
lyzed period. But the share of exports has increased slightly, and they at-
tracted additional FDI, originating mainly from Western Europe.  
But the success of MPC is somehow limited in relative terms. During the 
same period the countries from Eastern and Central Europe improved their 
relative position much more and reached macroeconomic stabilization as 
well. They were more successful in opening their economies; the tariff lib-
eralization was much deeper and the trade opening much more pronounced. 
The NMS were also much more successful in attracting foreign direct in-
vestments. This was an important source of increasing gross fixed capital 
formation in those countries.  
It seems that there are international legislative issues which can improve 
the performance of MPC. For example, approximation to EU regulations or 
ratification of international agreements - which are followed up by actual 
implementation and understanding of the agreed changes. This process 
should, for example, limit the restrictiveness of technical regulations and 
standards for MPC exports to the EU. Only then will policy changes help to 
improve the business environment. 
The improvement to the business climate is crucial and does not necessarily 
come at a high cost. The quality of domestic institutions (including the 
level of bureaucracy, law enforcement, transparency and corruption) should 
be improved. For example, more streamlined procedures for contract en-
forcement, better protection of intellectual property rights or the establish-
ment of a credit register are important measures which may help to bring 
about improvements to the business climate, fostering investment and 
growth.  
The relative progress of NMS in improving the business climate and the 
quality of domestic institutions has been much more pronounced, espe-
cially if one takes into consideration the very bad starting position of East 
European countries in the early 1990s. The ability to reform their econo-Jan J. Michalek 
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mies in the eve of accession was probably the main reason for better per-
formance of NMS. 
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10 Years Euro-Mediterranean             
Partnership: 
The Human Dimension Revisited 
I. 
When the Barcelona Declaration was promulgated on November 28, 2005, 
the perspectives for Euro-Mediterranean partnership were not particularly 
clear. Different actors on both shores of the Mediterranean favored differ-
ent priorities and the multitude of approaches was hardly able to be ac-
commodated under the umbrella of one declaration. Yet it happened, albeit 
in particular weak terms regarding the human dimension of the future proc-
ess.  “The participants recognize that the traditions of culture and civiliza-
tion throughout the Mediterranean region, dialogue between these cultures 
and exchanges at human, scientific and technological level are an essential 
factor in bringing their peoples closer, promoting understanding between 
them and improving their perception of each other.” 
1 The Barcelona Dec-
laration announced “to establish a partnership in social, cultural and human 
affairs”.
2 To this day, this promise has remained the weakest part of the 
Euro-Mediterranean Process.  
One of the reasons, if not the dominating one, has been a decade-long ab-
sence of formulating common strategic objectives, defining a consistent 
 
1  European Commission, The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership – Barcelona Declara-
tion, at: www.europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/euromed/bd.htm.  
2  Ibid. Ludger Kühnhardt 
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purpose and specifying the actors relevant to apply the available instru-
ments. Moreover: While the Barcelona Declaration remained a paper full of 
diplomatic niceties, aimed at building bridges without assessing the cur-
rents and depth of the waters, the world began to discuss the thesis of an 
imminent “clash of civilizations”. Samuel Huntington, not the Barcelona 
Declaration dominated the decade of cultural discourse among civiliza-
tions.
3 Although his book was often misinterpreted as a battle cry for civili-
zational clash – the opposite is true - , the emotional debate surrounding 
Huntington’s book was indicative for the combination of fear, mistrust and 
prejudice in the absence of perspective, commonality and focus in Euro-
Mediterranean human and cultural relations – on both shores of the Medi-
terranean. 
Huntington was right in stating that for the first time in history, global poli-
tics has become both multipolar and multi-civilizational. He was also right 
in outlining the inherent conflicts between Islamic faith and the evolution 
of a modern, secular and pluralistic society, law-based and not faith-
dependent. Yet, while the implication of this thesis requires sophisticated 
differentiation and debate, it was overly startling that the whole issue of 
religion – and notably the impact and relevance of religion for social, eco-
nomic, cultural and political developments - remained completely absent 
from the Barcelona Declaration, except for the shallow remark that “greater 
understanding among the major religions present in the Euro-
Mediterranean region will facilitate greater mutual tolerance and coopera-
tion”.
4 How to do this, by whom and to which end were questions left to 
speculate about, but not being addressed by the Barcelona Declaration. 
The same criticism, unfortunately, has to be added as far as the implication 
of cross-Mediterranean migration is concerned. While dialogue among cul-
tures should mean to “bringing the peoples closer”, the Barcelona Declara-
tion also had to admit “the importance of the role played by migration” 
(that is to say its problematic importance), as the Declaration recognized by 
 
3  Samuel Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, 
New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996. 
4  European Commission, The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership – Barcelona Declara-
tion, op.cit. 10 Years Euro-Mediterranean Partnership: The Human Dimension 
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stating the need to strengthen Euro-Mediterranean cooperation “to reduce 
migratory pressures, among other things through vocational training pro-
grams and programs of assistance for job creation”.
5 Paradoxical: Current 
Mediterranean migration patterns bring people together, but they are not 
favorable to bringing peoples together in an amicable spirit. Moreover, the 
invocation of the positive role of “civil society” contributions to the cul-
tural dialogue remained insufficient: the more the potential of the “civil so-
ciety” was invoked, the more its imaginary character became obvious. In 
the absence of a broad civil society on the southern shores of the Mediter-
ranean, but also under the migratory pressure from the Southern Mediterra-
nean to Europe and finally nurtured by the emergence of Islamic radicalism 
and terrorism, the whole idea of Euro-Mediterranean Partnership as a vehi-
cle to intercultural dialogue was put to the back-burner. What should have 
been the priority and the ultimate goal of the process became its main li-
ability. The regular encounter of professional groups only proves the ab-
sence of a real public sphere across the societies of all Euro-Mediterranean 
partners.  
II. 
Ten years after the Barcelona Declaration was promulgated, its flaws must 
be addressed in order to learn for the next decade of Euro-Mediterranean 
relations. Self-critical assessment has to include the realization that external 
factors and fear have dominated and focused the feeble agenda of 1995: 
The US-led focus on democratization of the Greater Middle East has 
gained more attention than practically all the valuable efforts stemming 
from the Barcelona Declaration’s goal to support civil society, rule of law 
and good governance in Europe’s Southern Mediterranean partner coun-
tries. This might be an unfair assessment and judgment, but by and large so 
it is. While the Barcelona Declaration was a document of diplomatic 
bridge-building, it could not serve to prioritize the need for reforms in the 
Southern partner countries aimed at enabling a viable and effective dia-
 
5  Ibid. Ludger Kühnhardt 
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logue among cultures. The deficits in civil society-formation among most 
Southern Mediterranean partner countries have been analyzed extensively.
6  
The fact that by 2005 the momentum has shifted from civil society and 
grassroot-level activities in promoting democracy to the “big picture” of 
overall political reform and democratization, if not regime change has not 
been induced by the Barcelona Process. Sure, the rich European experience 
with ten years of the Barcelona Process and the continuously refining char-
acter of EU policies can certainly become useful for the implementation of 
the overall goal of democratization and political reform. But the EU cannot 
credit the Barcelona Process to have unequivocally shaped this overall tar-
get and strategic goal. It became priority only as a consequence of Ameri-
can policies favoring regime change in Iraq, supported by the highly 
valuable work and impact of the  UN-sponsored Arab Human Development 
Report
7. US policy towards the Greater Middle East might have been un-
wise, driven by fear and not by a comprehensive strategy, and it might have 
been based on hubris and arrogance. In any case, US policies have created 
facts. The UN-sponsored Arab Human Development Report has focused 
the debate on reform in the Arab world more than the EU could have hoped 
for to achieve through all its available means of dialogue and cooperation. 
Unfortunately, one has to concede that politics of fear has even increased in 
Europe throughout the last decade, often due to the effect of legal and ille-
gal patterns of migration from the southern shores of the Mediterranean. At 
the same time, the rather limited circle of friends of the Euro-
Mediterranean partnership has not been broken in order to anchor the 
meaning of this process in the broader political and public discourse across 
the EU. The dialogue of civilizations as part of the Euro-Mediterranean 
Partnership remains a promise and has not become a reality yet. 
In order to have an impact in the Euro-Mediterranean context and beyond, 
the European Union must reassess priorities, goals and instruments of its 
intercultural ambition. The analysis must be honest, the question of who 
 
6  See Bettina Huber, Governance, civil society and security in the EMP: Lessons for a 
more effective partnership, Euromesco Paper No.39, Lisbon: Euro-Mediterranean 
Study Commission, 2004. 10 Years Euro-Mediterranean Partnership: The Human Dimension 
  87
can act how, where and to which aim has to be addressed in a more focused 
way, and substantial priorities cannot shy away from taboos, including the 
importance of religion for any serious dialogue among the Mediterranean 
civilizations. Europe’s religious exceptionalism – stronger secularization 
than anywhere else in the world coupled with a widely spread conviction of 
the superiority of its secular humanism – must find a critical assessment if 
Europe wants to be taken seriously as a partner of inter-cultural and inter-
religious dialogue in the Southern Mediterranean. 
III. 
To give the human dimension in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership solid 
meaning during the next decade, two “hot potatoes” have to be dealt with 
in the process of reassessing the EU’s approach. One issue is migration, the 
other issue is the inter-religious dialogue. While the first issue is currently 
dominated by instincts of fear, the latter one is hampered by superficiality 
and ignorance. As none of it is helpful for refocusing the human dimension 
of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, both matters have to be reconsid-
ered.  
In light of this migration to the European Union from the countries of 
Northern Africa or the Arab Middle East is the function of socio-economic 
deprivation and absence of free societies among EU partner states.  By 
2020, Arab countries will have to generate 100 million new jobs for their 
young and growing population. In the absence of realistic perspectives, 
millions of young Arabs might want to migrate to Europe, no matter the 
cold reception they usually receive in Europe. As worrisome for Europe 
should be the age gap between the EU and the Arab world. In 2050, a 
young Yemenite will be 32 years younger on average than the average 
European. While the latter is contemplating health and pension issues, the 
Yemenite will still be concerned about his own productive future and cer-
tainly that of his children. The main focus of the EU’s strategy towards the 
societies of the southern shore of the Mediterranean must be directed to 
 
7  The UN Arab Human Development Report, at: www.undp.org.  Ludger Kühnhardt 
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improve the perspectives for decent living in all countries of the region. 
Yet, migration – legal and illegal – will continue into the European Union 
although many migrants know that they are not very warmly received and 
rather have to confront a second-class citizen life in most places. Since 
2003, Spain has been the largest recipient country of migration to the EU. 
From 1.6 million people migrating into the EU in that year alone, 594.300 
came to Spain alone. This was more than twice the migration Germany 
(144.900) and France (55.000) combined experienced. Italy has become the 
second largest recipient of migrants to the EU (511.200 in 2003).
8 
In light of this migration pattern, the European Union must reconsider the 
human dimension of its Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. This necessary 
recalibration has two directions. On the one hand, the EU must keep migra-
tion into the EU manageable and legally-based. This requires a common 
migration policy with clarity about the goal and size of migration into the 
EU. It also requires an EU Border Police to prevent illegal migration into 
the EU. This is the only way in order to de-criminalize migration and to 
recognize the legality of those migrants who come to the EU with consent 
of the EU and its member states. The human dimension concerning mi-
grants must begin in Europe by way of recognizing migrants - that is to say 
acknowledged migrants who come to the EU in line with strategic objec-
tives concerning their value and purpose - as human beings and as a posi-
tive contribution to the EU’s future. Beside an increased focus on the 
development of human resources in the southern partner countries, beside 
the quest for socio-economic progress and political reforms in the partner 
countries, beside the need to balance the reception of migrants across the 
EU, the European Union needs to contribute to a changing perspective 
among its citizens as far as the effect of migrants into the EU is concerned. 
Against the overall prejudice that migrants pose as burden to the European 
society – while yet they are welcome as cheap annual laborer, not only in 
seasonal jobs – the EU should generate a campaign to promote the enrich-
ing effect of migration for the overall European development (certainly in 
light of the productivity gap with the US and the demographic deficit inside 
 
8  See Eurostat, European Demography in 2003, August 31, 2004, www.epp.eurostat. 
cec.eu.int/cache/ITY_PUBLIC?3-31082004-BP/EN/3-31082004-BP-EN.PDF.  10 Years Euro-Mediterranean Partnership: The Human Dimension 
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the EU). This has a robust economic component as far as growth genera-
tion, productivity, and sometimes even the creation of jobs through entre-
preneurial activities of migrants are concerned. Migration has a cultural 
dimension as far as the broadening of European horizons is concerned. 
Most importantly, however, migration should be re-defined as a contribu-
tion to reinvigorate European society. Failing to do so does not resolve any 
of the objective problems related to migration. Europe would only impose a 
burden of pessimism on its own shoulders. After all, Europe can’t be so 
bad, absent of optimism and potential, if so many migrants come or want to 
come. As they do not only bring problems and primarily pose a burden, the 
attitude towards them should rather be a welcoming one. This however can 
work only if reciprocity is involved. Migrants must respect the local way of 
life, its dominant culture, and, most importantly, its rules of law. The EU 
should develop instruments that can grant migrants some sort of a tempo-
rary citizen status, not equal to full citizenship – and if so only on the basis 
of complete readiness to integrate into the host society -, but a sort of tem-
porary inclusion into the host community on the very local level. Such a 
status must define rights and duties in order to give migrants a voice, frame 
their life in Europe as one of pro-active contribution to their host commu-
nity instead of one they are forced to perceive as  adding burden and prob-
lems. As long as migrants come to Europe and live in Europe, they simply 
must be recognized with all rights and duties in the local community with-
out granting them full EU citizen status. The EU must develop some sort of 
status that can encompass recognition and participation, rights and duties, 
and it must do so in a way different from the problematic notion of dual 
citizenship. 
European city planning must address the danger of growing outskirts with 
an emerging character of socio-cultural slums. European cities must con-
tribute to the necessary mix of children in local schools against the trend of 
ghettoizing migrants – mostly with Arab or African background – while the 
indigenous population is escaping into other parts of the inner cities. Euro-
pean cities must become much more pro-active to turn migrants into ordi-
nary neighbors. As for the migrants, the key to recognition is their 
readiness to abide to local law, to prevent the danger of self-ghettoization Ludger Kühnhardt 
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by sticking to one’s own cultural group, and most importantly, to acquire a 
high level of proficiency of the local language. The human dimension in 
the Euro-Mediterranean partnership will only succeed if Europe’s cities and 
local communities get involved by realizing Europe has become a continent 
of immigration and that the patterns of this migration have turned many of 
Europe’s cities into “Mediterranean cities” even if they are not physically 
located at the shores of the Mediterranean.  
The “forma mentis” of the Mediterranean, “this identity in doing” things 
together, as Malta’s former President Guido de Marco put it, should not be 
idealized. It is, at best evolving as a “correct interaction between the peo-
ples of this sea”, he added.
 9 As far as migration from the Southern Medi-
terranean to Europe is concerned, one should not reduce the focus to overly 
intellectual expectations: The majority of migrants from the Mediterra-
nean’s southern shores belong to the labor class. To idealize their way of 
life can easily be criticized as cynical. Their preferred way of life might 
also not facilitate lasting contributions to the intellectual enrichment of 
Europe’s indigenous identity. Yet, as long as Europe accepts migrants from 
the Mediterranean’s southern shores, they must be treated with respect and 
dignity. This is not a plea for romantic multi-culturalism. It only is the real-
istic recognition of a kind of diversity Europe has to learn to live with. 
Europe might prefer to build barriers to migration, but in light of the cur-
rent fact this does not seem to be plausible, nor would it make economic 
sense. Europe must overcome its mentality of fear if it wants to redefine the 
issue of migration, and most notably Muslim migration. It is here that inter-
religious dialogue becomes essential, because it can bind intellectuals and 
non-intellectuals alike.  
 
9  Guido de Marco, The Future of Euro-Mediterranean Relations: the Vision of Malta, 
in: Andreas Jacobs (ed.), Euro-Mediterranean Co-Operation: Enlarging and Widen-
ing the Perspective, ZEI Discussion Paper C 131, Bonn: Center for European Inte-
gration Studies, 2004: 14. 10 Years Euro-Mediterranean Partnership: The Human Dimension 
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IV. 
The most natural element of cultural identity for most migrants to the EU 
with a home in countries of the Southern Mediterranean is their respective 
religion. No matter whether laborer or intellectual, the Islamic faith is dis-
tinctively different from the majority population surrounding migrants in 
the EU. This is why the need for an inter-religious dialogue is the most evi-
dent starting point for a genuine human dimension in the Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership. The EU must revise its absence of a genuine 
religious component in its perspectives for the human dimension in Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership. Instead, it must emphasize the potential of in-
ter-religious dialogue as the fundamental cultural root to energize the hu-
man dimension of Euro-Mediterranean encounters among the societies on 
both sides of the Mediterranean at large, European and Arab countries in 
particular and between Europeans and Muslim migrants in the widest pos-
sible outreach. The issue is not a new openness for religion as such, but the 
issue is one of reflecting again about the role of religion in society and in 
public life.  The EU should not only focus on political encounters, but 
should encourage EU citizens to go ahead and pave the ground for a most 
natural human dialogue of cultures, religions and traditions, intended to 
learn from each others difference as a key to forge bonds of united com-
mitment in dealing with the overall challenges of modern life and society. 
This, of course, requires that Europeans know of their own religion and the 
religion of Christianity, which has shaped Europe’s identity even if many 
Europeans might not appreciate or accept this any longer. Guido de Marco, 
the former President of Malta, so aptly stated: “To neglect the cradle that 
nurses Europe is to abandon the roots of Europe.”
10 
Inter-religious dialogue brings the human dimension of the Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership to its center and into the European Union. Mus-
lim migration to Europe often tends to be exaggerated. The feeling of its 
threatening character is often a function of three interrelated components: 
exaggeration of the size of Muslim communities in Europe, devaluation of 
faith and knowledge about religion among the indigenous (that is to say by 
 
10 Ibid.: 11. Ludger Kühnhardt 
  92   
and large Christian) European population, and a superficial approach to the 
very issue of inter-religious encounter. In most EU member states, the 
Muslim population has become the second biggest religious group. Yet, the 
absolute numbers show its relative size.  Exaggeration of these facts is 
wrong, shying away from their effect simply impossible. The EU should be 
sensitive not to confound “normal” Muslims with those radicals, whose 
Islamic fundamentalist ideas and actions are a threat to liberal-pluralist so-
cieties indeed. Having said this, one must also self-critically approach the 
devaluation of religious convictions among many formal (or only formerly) 
Christians in Europe. As far as its secularization is concerned, Europe has 
become the exceptional continent. It could not have come as a surprise that 
the debate about the inclusion of its Christian heritage and current reality 
into the European Constitution had only a very limited success. 
The reluctance to include the invocation of God in the European Constitu-
tion’s preamble reflected the uncertainty over religion and its consequences 
among “Christian Europe” itself. In the early 21st century, not only overly 
pious observers were astonished about the “precipitously declining religios-
ity” in Europe.11 A Gallup millennium survey of religious attitudes in 
1999 and related surveys had brought awareness to the fact that for 49 per-
cent of Danes, 55 percent of Swedes and even 65 percent of Czechs God 
did not matter, while 82 percent of Americans stressed that God is “very 
important” in their life. 48 percent of West Europeans hardly ever go to 
church, for Eastern Europe the figure was a little lower than 44 percent.12 
“Eurobarometer” surveys uphold the importance of religiosity in the life of 
all European people. However, the gap between theory and practice could 
not be bigger and it is often their uncertainty about the public sphere of re-
ligion that makes many Europeans to react almost helpless in the face of 
the firm belief of others. But even Christian believers might have to con-
front resentment, pressure or cynicism as the Italian candidate for the office 
of an EU Commissioner, Rocco Buttiglione, in  2004.  His  faith  prevented  
 
 
11 Niall Ferguson, Colossus: The Price of America’s Empire, New York: Penguin 
Press, 2004: 236. 
12 Ibid.: 237. 10 Years Euro-Mediterranean Partnership: The Human Dimension 
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Muslims in the European Union  
EU member state  Total population
13  Muslim population  Percentage of Mus-
lim population
14 
Austria 8.208.000  372.800  4.2  % 
Belgium 10.457.000  382.870 3.7  % 
Bulgaria 7.746.000  950.000-1.000.000  12-13  % 
Croatia 4.443.000  58.500  1.3  % 
Cyprus 762.000  210.000  22  % 
Czech Republic  10.239.000  20.000-30.000  2-3 % 
Denmark 5.419.000  151.500  2.8  % 
Estonia 1.341.000  5.000-10.000  .36-0.72  % 
France 62.095.000  5.000.000  8.1  % 
Finland 5.246.000  21.000  0.4  % 
Germany 82.583.000  3.400.000  3.9  % 
Greece 11.085.000  372.600  3.5  % 
Great Britain  59.754.000  1.591.000  2.7 % 
Hungary 10.064.000  3.000  0.02  % 
Ireland 4.177.000  10.000 0.2  % 
Italy 58.344.000  705.000  1.2  % 
Latvia 2.306.000  3.000  0.12  % 
Lithuania 3.423.000 7.000  1.9  % 
Luxembourg 462.000  7.500  1.6  % 
Malta 404.000  3.000 0.8  % 
Netherlands 16.338.000  750.628  4.6  % 
Poland 38.091.000  4.000  0.005  % 
Portugal 10.609.000  40.000  0.4  % 
Romania 21.489.000  90.000  0.4  % 
Slovakia 5.380.000  10.829  0.2  % 
Slovenia 1.998.000  30.247  1.6  % 
Spain 41.545.000  402.000  1.0  % 
Sweden 9.077.000  305.500 3.4  % 
 
 
13 See European Union. European Commission, Statistical Annex to European Econ-
omy, March 16, 2005, europa.eu.int/comm./economy_finance/publications/European 
_economy-2005/statannex0105.htm. 
14 See Zentrum für Türkeistudien, ed., “Euro-Islam: Eine Religion etabliert sich in Eu-
ropa”, ZfT Aktuell,. 102 (2004): 41-42. Ludger Kühnhardt 
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him from being acceptable for public office – a unique case of religious 
persecution in post-totalitarian Europe and astonishing for a continent be-
ing so proud of its protection of human rights, the right of religious free-
dom including. 
Under such circumstances, the first step for a serious and respectful inter-
religious dialogue must be for secularized Europe to regain competence of 
religion, respect for faith and more recognition of its own religious roots. 
Only proper rooting in one’s own tradition can help to open up in honesty 
to others. A dialogue of tolerance that remains limited to the invocation of 
secondary virtues all religious traditions share will easily end as an act of 
shallow relativism and agnostic syncretism. It is therefore overly important 
to reflect on the meaning of the term “spiritual ecumenism”, which Pope 
Benedict XVI. has used in his first encounter with leaders of other Chris-
tian communities and, moreover, with religious leaders from across the 
world, Muslims including.
15 Only one day after the beginning of his pon-
tificate, this encounter of the new Roman-Catholic Pope was a remarkable 
sign of hope that the Catholic church – after all the biggest Christian church 
on the European shores of the Mediterranean – will take the leadership in 
an honest religious dialogue that is based on respect for each others faith, 
certain of one’s own faith and standpoint, and only thus capable of a true, 
sincere, and if necessary, also critical dialogue with Muslims and their rep-
resentatives. “Warm and affectionate” were the greetings of the Pope to the 
representatives of non-Christian religions and “particularly grateful” his 
feeling for the presence of members of the Muslim community. “I assure 
you,” he told them, “that the Church wants to continue building bridges of 
friendship with the followers of all religions, in order to seek the true good 
of every person and of society as a whole.”
16  
The European Union’s human dimension strategy for an enhanced Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership ought to be rooted in such a pro-active and in-
clusive spirit. Without respect for religious truth – the Christian one intrin-
 
15 Address of his Holiness Benedict XVI to the Delegates of other churches and eccle-
sial communities and of other religious traditions, Vatican, April 25, 2005. 
www.vatican.va/holy_father/benedict_xvi/speeches/2005/april/... 
16 Ibid. 10 Years Euro-Mediterranean Partnership: The Human Dimension 
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sically linked to the European tradition, but likewise the religious truth 
claimed by Judaism and Islam, the other two religions of the Book and of 
the same God - inter-cultural and inter-religious dialogue will not 
strengthen the freedom it strives for in the name of tolerance. The European 
Union must promote a new openness for the public role of religion inside 
Europe shall it succeed in its formal inter-cultural dialogue across the 
shores of the Mediterranean. The EU must give room for the public voice 
of religion in the public debate about the future of Europe. It must ask pro-
actively about the role and meaning of religious views for the evolution of 
socio-economic, cultural and political developments in Europe. Timidity 
and self-restraint in the name of laicistic principles cannot prevail if Europe 
wants to be taken seriously in the Muslim world on the matter of serious 
inter-religious dialogue and reflection of the public meaning of faith and 
religion.  
The increase of EU citizens from Christian orthodox countries adds another 
dimension to this quest. With its eastward enlargement, Latin Europe is 
encountering Orthodox Christianity under the roof of the same political 
sphere as never before since the religious schism among Christians in the 
11th century. It is time to focus the implications of this new reality. Matters 
of Christian social doctrine and their implication for Europe’s role in the 
age of globalization are as relevant to this encounter as the common reflec-
tion about Christian attitudes towards Muslims. 
Muslim-Christian relations must be based on the principal of reciprocity. 
This includes the recognition of freedom of religious practice, for Muslims 
across Europe, for Christians in all Muslim countries – including, of 
course, in EU candidate country Turkey. The biggest challenge for 
Europe’s encounter with the Muslim dimension of the southern shores of 
the Mediterranean is political. Neither intellectually, nor politically has 
Europe come to terms with the question how to deal with political Islam. 
Ignoring its relevance in the public discourse of many partner countries of 
the Euro-Mediterranean process is impossible. Being fearful of it in recog-
nition of the potential radicalism and presumed anti-Western orientation of 
political Islam is insufficient and mostly shortsighted. Islam, it seems to 
me, is not antagonistic to honestly rooted Christian faith, values and tradi-Ludger Kühnhardt 
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tions. Islam’s ”enemy” (as the enemy of all distinct religious convictions 
and ways of life) is religious ignorance and indifference. Secular, libertar-
ian liberalism with its inherent moral relativism should worry defensive 
Christian Europe no less than aggressive Islam. Yet, Europe ought to de-
velop a consistent strategy of how to approach the exchange of ideas with 
political Islam. Terms of engagement must be defined, but walls of rejec-
tion cannot be built nor would they be effective. First and foremost, these 
terms of engagement with political Islam must include: rejection of all 
forms of violence, recognition of human rights, including reciprocity for 
freedom of religion, and acceptance of mutually binding rule of law.  
The bottom line of my argument: The human dimension in Euro-
Mediterranean relations has to begin at home, inside the EU. Shall the EU 
succeed, together with its partners from the southern shores of the Mediter-
ranean, to give more convincing and effective meaning to the role of the 
human dimension and inter-cultural encounter, it will have to strengthen 
the inner-European dimension of its external ambition. Migration and relig-
ion cannot be dealt with any more in the superficial or fearful way as it 
primarily happened during the first decade of the Barcelona Process. The 
learning process must begin at home in order to succeed across the Medi-
terranean shores. Otherwise, the EU cannot assure its strategic objectives 
and root them in the European society. This, however, is more necessary 
than ever. In fact, it has become the first obligation for the human dimen-
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